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Foreword:
The Marriage Cases-Reversing the




The California Supreme Court has replaced the New York Court of
Appeals, the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the U.S.
Supreme Court as the court at the cutting edge of many issues in American
public law. The process of displacement probably began long ago, perhaps as
early as 1948, when the California Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Sharp
became the first appellate decision to recognize that state bars to interracial
marriage are unconstitutional.' That landmark decision has been followed by a
steady stream of others. The latest such decision is In re Marriage Cases, in
which a closely divided (4-3) court held that the State's exclusion of same-sex
couples from civil marriage violated the state constitution's equal protection
guarantee.
2
Chief Justice Ronald George's opinion for the court in the Marriage
Cases was significant for three reasons. First, and most important, was the
holding: the State could not constitutionally bar same-sex couples from civil
marriage. California was not only the second state to recognize same-sex
marriage in this way,3 but was the grand prize for the same-sex marriage
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1. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
2. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
3. Massachusetts was the first. See Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); see also In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004)
(reaffirming the court's opposition to the segregation of same-sex civil unions as established by
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movement. California is our nation's most populous state, with thirty-seven
million people and fifty-five members of the federal legislative branch (more
than 10 percent of the total), and it has one of the largest economies in the
world.4 Thus, California's policies have ripple effects well beyond its borders.
Second, as part of its reasoning, the court held that sexual orientation is a
"suspect classification," like race and (in California) sex, that cannot be the
basis of discriminatory state policy without a showing of compelling state
interests that can only be met by such discrimination.5 Two other state supreme
courts had suggested as much (in dictum) before 2008,6 but the California
Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to unequivocally declare
sexual orientation a suspect classification. After the Marriage Cases, state
courts all over the country will probably take these arguments more seriously.
7
Third, as an alternative basis for strict scrutiny, the court ruled that the
fundamental right to marry applies to lesbian and gay couples. 8 Although this
holding seems the most logically apparent, it is also the most pioneering: no
appellate court in America had ever accepted the notion that the right to marry
has any application to lesbian and gay couples. In the wake of California's
actions, three state legislatures extended fundamental marriage rights to lesbian
and gay couples by legislation.
9
legislation passed subsequent to the Goodridge decision). Shortly after the Marriage Cases, the
Connecticut Supreme Court struck down that state's exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage. Kerrigan v. Connecticut Dep't Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). Both
Goodridge and Kerrigan were decided by 4-3 court majorities. In a unanimous opinion joined by
all seven justices, the Iowa Supreme Court recently struck down its same-sex marriage ban.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
4. MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 144-
52 (2006) (documenting California's fifty-three Representatives and two Senators and describing
the state's preeminent demographic and economic position in this country).
5. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 440-44.
6. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499-500 (Ky. 1992) (dictum). The
unpublished opinion in Baehr v. Miike (Dec. 9, 1999) indicated that the Hawaii Supreme Court
agreed that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, but the published opinion is just a
summary order. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
7. Two courts have already followed California in ruling that sexual orientation
discrimination requires heightened (but not strict) scrutiny. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431-61;
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 889-96.
8. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419-34.
9. In 2005 and 2007, the California legislature passed bills to implement fundamental
marriage rights for same-sex couples, but in both years Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
successfully vetoed those bills. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 410 n.17 (discussing the 2005
and 2007 same-sex marriage bills). In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont, Maine, and New
Hampshire passed marriage recognition bills. The governor of Vermont vetoed the bill, but his
veto was overridden on April 7, 2009. Act No. 3, S. 115, 2009-10 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009). The
governor of Maine signed the bill into law on May 6, 2009. L.D. No. 1020, S.P. No. 384, 124th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2009), but in November 2009, the voters revoked the new marriage law in a
popular referendum. After negotiation of statutory language protecting religious freedom, the
governor of New Hampshire likewise signed onto same-sex marriage on June 3, 2009. H.B. 436,
161st Sess. Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2009); H.B. 310, 161st Sess. Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2009); H.B. 73, 161st
Sess. Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2009).
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As in many other states, the political process in California has several
avenues for responding to state constitutional decisions such as the Marriage
Cases. One avenue is a popular vote: upon collection of the requisite number of
voter signatures, the electorate can override the court through a constitutional
amendment adopted by majority vote. The voters overrode the holding of the
Marriage Cases when they adopted Proposition 8 in November 2008. Proposi-
tion 8 added language to the state constitution reserving civil marriage for one
man, one woman unions.
This Foreword will examine the court's opinion and the many doctrinal
issues it raises through the lens of California's pluralist-constitutional democra-
cy. That voters can override the court through a constitutional amendment like
Proposition 8 makes California's constitution self-evidently democratic-
indeed, more so than the U.S. Constitution. This feature has played a pivotal
role in the state's politics of gay marriage. An equally important feature of the
California Constitution is its commitment to pluralism: the idea that a key role
of the State is to serve as a peaceful forum in which rival social and economic
groups bargain, compete, and deliberate. An institutional challenge in a plural-
ist democracy is to keep rival groups engaged in politics, to direct their efforts
toward the public good, and to avoid feuds and other mutually destructive
conflicts. This challenge is especially difficult because the pluralist balance
changes, often radically, over the course of a generation. New groups, clamor-
ing for public recognition, will emerge, upsetting a balance of alliances that
worked well only ten years prior. Few groups reflect this phenomenon better
than sexual and gender minorities; reviled as outlaws two generations ago, they
are now part of the political process in California. Given the state's role as
harbinger for the nation, this is a significant advance for these minorities.
Part I will explore the role of the California judiciary in the pluralist
debates surrounding sexual and gender minorities. California's treatment of gay
people can be broken into three stages. In Stage 1, "homosexuals" were
rejected as outlaws. In Stage 2, homosexuality came to be considered a
tolerable sexual variation, intrinsically inferior and degraded but not outlawed.
In Stage 3, the current stage, homosexuality is viewed as a benign variation,
and gay people are legally treated as (almost) full and equal citizens. At every
point in this history, California's judiciary was the branch of government most
responsive to the plight of sexual minorities and played an important, but
limited, role in gay people's politics of recognition. The main role of judges
was to reverse the force of political inertia. If legislators or enforcement
officials sought to punish or discriminate against minorities in an overbroad or
unjustified way, judges would often trim back the punishment or discrimina-
tion-but only where there was some public support for this stance and where
opportunities existed for the political process to reverse the judiciary and insist
upon the antigay policy. The judicially advanced ideas of privacy, nondis-
crimination, and family encouraged more gay people to be politically engaged
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and to metaphorically come out of their closets. The Marriage Cases can be
viewed as the culmination of several generations of normative debate about the
civil status of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) persons: a
group that had once been rejected, and then simply tolerated, finally achieved
acceptance in the eyes of the law.
Part II will situate the Marriage Cases in a larger conceptual framework
that I have called equality practice.'0 An important goal of constitutional
equality jurisprudence is management of the polity's evolving pluralist balance.
A dynamic society carries with it the risk of social turmoil as new groups
emerge and old groups decline or change. Equality jurisprudence is a key
mechanism for heading off some of that turmoil. For example, once a social
group emerges as a salient political force, old discriminations must be
questioned and newer ones interrogated, lest the new group feel alienated and
turn away from the ordinary political and legal processes. Conversely, older
groups' time-tested beliefs cannot and ought not be discarded without a process
of deliberation. California's Marriage Cases are a classic example of equality
practice: the court's invalidation was only possible because of decades of
political activism on other issues (sodomy laws, antidiscrimination policies,
and domestic partnerships) that gradually prepared the way for judicial recogni-
tion of full marriage equality for LGBT unions.
Part III examines the pluralist-constitutional politics of states like
California that have a process for constitutional change through popular
initiatives. The Part begins by describing the background of Proposition 8,
which overrode the precise holding of the Marriage Cases by amending the
California Constitution to bar recognition of any but one man, one woman
marriages. Part III then explains the various ways in which litigants can
challenge the constitutionality of popularly adopted constitutional amendments.
In the 2008 term, the Califomia Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 against
such an attack, but with a modest pushback against the popular override.'"
Political scientists have identified a major problem posed by initiative-based
constitutional amendments like Proposition 8-the phenomenon of hyper-
amendability. In states that have experienced this phenomenon, political issues
of all kinds, including fundamental constitutional issues, have gravitated away
from state deliberative institutions and toward resolution by popular referenda.
Part III concludes by proposing a theory of judicial review that attempts to
ameliorate the negative effects of hyper-amendability in the constitutional
amendment initiative context.
10. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS (2002).
11. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
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I
REVERSING THE BURDEN OF INERTIA: THE ROLE OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT IN ADVANCING THE RIGHTS OF SEXUAL AND GENDER MINORITIES
California's understanding and treatment of sexual minorities has gone
through a three-stage evolution that classically reflects the stages in which the
pluralist democracy accommodates new groups such as gay people. In Stage 1,
any kind of sexual variation (especially homosexuality) was considered
malignant. During this stage, California law considered "degenerates," "sex
perverts," and "homosexuals" to be outlaws. In Stage 2, homosexuality was
considered a tolerable sexual variation, intrinsically inferior and degraded but
not outlawed. In Stage 3, the current stage, homosexuality is considered a
benign variation (as a matter of law), and sexual minorities are thought not to
pose a danger to society. At every point in this history, California's judiciary
has played a critical role in both senses of the term: it has made important
rulings and has subjected legislative and executive policies to skeptical
examination. Although the court's critical role has been subject to legislative or
popular overrides, its interventions have, virtually without exception, formed
the basis for productive state policy.
A. Stage 1: "Degenerates, " "Sex Perverts, " and "Homosexuals" as Outlaws
In the early decades of statehood, California law did not recognize
homosexuals as a distinct social category or specifically outlaw homosexual
activities. Following other jurisdictions, the legislature in 1850 criminalized
"[t]he infamous crime against nature."' 12 Such laws were not specifically
designed to suppress gender and sexual noncomformity. Almost all of the
reported cases involved sexual assault against an unconsenting man, boy, girl,
or animal.13 Moreover, the "crime against nature" was limited to anal sex and
did not include oral sex, as the California Supreme Court held in People v.
Boyle. 4 Because a person could not be convicted of sodomy based solely upon
the testimony of a willing adult partner, it was practically impossible to convict
consenting adults, unless the act was public. 5 For these reasons, there were
very few sodomy convictions before 1890.16
12. 1850 Cal. Stat. 234, § 48.
13. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at app. 2,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Cato Lawrence Brief] (listing
the reported nineteenth-century American sodomy cases). Disclosure: I was the primary author of
this amicus brief.
14. 48 P. 800 (Cal. 1897).
15. See Cato Lawrence Brief, supra note 13, at 11-12 (documenting proof requirements for
nineteenth-century sodomy laws). Under nineteenth-century sodomy laws, consenting
"accomplices" could not provide sufficient evidence to convict of sodomy; this made it virtually
impossible to enforce such laws against consensual conduct in the home. See id.
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation
of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1014-16 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge,
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In the early twentieth century, California, like other American jurisdic-
tions, saw a growing social anxiety regarding publicly visible communities of
sexual minorities in urban areas such as San Francisco (ridiculed by some as
"Sodom by the Sea") and Los Angeles. 17 Some citizens objected to "sodom-
ites" who violated natural law and biblical admonitions against nonprocreative
sexuality; others expressed disgust with people whom medical experts termed
physical and mental "inverts" or "degenerates."'1 8 Homosexuals were widely
considered threats to the fabric of society and body politic. 19 Some believed
that the "degeneracy" could be passed on to future generations, both through
inheritable biological characteristics and by example. The degeneracy theory
of this era tied racist beliefs to prejudices against sexual and gender minorities;
many doctors explicitly linked "degenerate" (non-European) races with gender
and sexual inversion. 21 Just as abhorrent depictions of African-Americans as
apes have been shown to survive in subconscious but easily triggered stereo-
22types, the notion of homosexuals as unclean, primitive "degenerates" is an
enduring stereotype that still infects the popular imagination.
23
Implementing these social attitudes, early twentieth-century law enforce-
ment episodically targeted "inverts" and "degenerates." For example, police in
Long Beach, California, arrested thirty-one men for being part of an oral sex
ring in 1914. 24 Two undercover officers, W.H. Warren and B.C. Brown,
infiltrated male sex clubs. Befriending men attracted to them, the officers lured
them into compromising positions in public restrooms, bathhouses, or private
apartments, where spying colleagues arrested the "degenerates." The news-
papers raised an alarm against these "devils" committing "a horrible enormity
besides which ordinary prostitution is chastity itself."25 Legally, however, these
Construction].
17. See NAN ALAMILLA BOYD, SAN FRANCISCO WAS A WIDE-OPEN TOWN: A HISTORY OF
QUEER SAN FRANCISCO TO 1965 (2003) [hereinafter BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN]; LILLIAN
FADERMAN & STUART TIMMONS, GAY L.A.: A HISTORY OF SEXUAL OUTLAWS, POWER POLITICS,
AND LIPSTICK LESBIANS 14-30 (2006) [hereinafter FADERMAN & TIMMONS, GAY L.A.].
18. On the transition from sodomite to degenerate, see JENNIFER TERRY, AMERICAN
OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY (1999).
19. See id.; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 17-37 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW].
20. See, e.g., G. FRANK LYDSTON, THE DISEASES OF SOCIETY 37, 308-09, and passim
(1904).
21. JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 65-67 (1976); SIOBHAN B.
SOMERVILLE, QUEERING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE INVENTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (2000).
22. Philip Atiba Goff & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Opinion, A Hateful Link, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2009, at A19.
23. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 209-11 (documenting the perseverance of
popular understanding of "homosexuals" as dirty sub-humans who are predatory against youth).
24. For the story of the Long Beach arrests and prosecutions, see Publicity Is Needed and
Then More Publicity, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1914, § 2, at 8 [hereinafter Publicity Is Needed]; see
also FADERMAN & TIMMONS, supra note 17, at 30-37.
25. Publicity is Needed, supra note 24, § 2, at 8.
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men had committed no felony, because of the court's ruling in Boyle that the
crime against nature did not include oral sex. Thus, some of the men were
charged with vagrancy, a misdemeanor. Florist Herbert Lowe was acquitted of
even these charges by a jury.26 Responding immediately to the general public
outrage prompted by these "lenient" penalties, the California legislature in
1915 added to the penal code's list of serious felonies "fellatio" and "cunnilin-
gus" (changed six years later to "oral copulation").27
In addition to strengthening laws aimed at "crimes against nature," state
and local authorities pursued other regulatory means of suppressing same-sex
intimacy and gender nonconformity. Some regulatory mechanisms addressed
gender-deviant activities, most notably through criminal prohibitions on cross-
dressing, which were first codified in the mid-1800s and proliferated
throughout the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.2' For
example, San Francisco made it a crime for anyone to appear in public "in a
dress not belonging to his or her sex" in 1866. Oakland followed suit in 1879
and Los Angeles in 1898. 29 By 1930, most of the largest California cities had
similar laws.
30
More important were the new laws regulating sexual solicitation and
erotic activities. Originally enacted in 1872, California's "lewd vagrancy" law
(later colloquially known as the "vag lewd" law) was expanded in 1903 to
make it a crime to be either an "idle, or lewd, or dissolute person or associate of
known thieves" or to be a "common prostitute." 3 1 Another 1903 statute made
"outrages [to] public decency" a crime, as well as "personifjying] any person
other than himself' for a lewd purpose. 32 These laws became the most deployed
criminal sanction in California against same-sex intimacy, and were also used
at least in some local jurisdictions to punish cross-dressing women and female
impersonators.33 When California's legislature adopted its oral copulation
statute in 1921, it also enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor to engage in
"any act. . . which openly outrages public decency."34
26. FADERMAN & TIMMONS, supra note 17, at 33-35.
27. 1915 Cal. Stat. 1022, repealed and replaced, 1921 Cal. Stat. 1633 (renaming the crime
"oral copulation").
28. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 27-29.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 338 (listing California jurisdictions making public cross-dressing a crime). For a
description of shifting police attitudes, see Louis SULLIVAN, FROM FEMALE TO MALE: THE LIFE
OF JACK B. GARLAND (1990) (telling the life of Elvira Mugarietta, a woman who passed as a man
from 1892 to 1936 in California).
31. 1903 Cal. Stat. 97 (lewd vagrancy).
32. Id. at 235-36 (indecency).
33. See generally Arthur Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues, and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need
of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960); see also Jon Gallo et al., The Consenting Homosexual
and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13
UCLA L. REV. 643 (1966) (student project).
34. 1921 Cal. Stat. 74.
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As the vag lewd and public decency laws indicate, by the 1920s, almost
any kind of activity deviating from standard sexual intercourse could be a crime
in California. Unlike the earlier period, these crimes were sometimes vigorous-
ly enforced by the police. By the 1910s, police in the large American cities
were arresting dozens of men each year for felonious sodomy, and hundreds for
lesser crimes of cross-dressing, indecent exposure, lewd vagrancy, and so
35 36forth.35 Similar arrests were regularly made in California.
The volume of police harassment and arrest exploded on both coasts in the
1920s. 37 But more importantly, the pattern of arrests and prosecutions took a
turn away from the previously exclusive focus on rape and abuse of minors and
toward enforcement against consenting adults of the same sex. 38 For the next
few decades, the so-called "homosexual" was a universal scapegoat in
California. He would be blamed for waves of child molestation, for the
"corruption" of youth by the sexualization of public culture, and for the decline
of the family.
To enforce the law against consenting adult "homosexuals," police
engaged in nosy tactics such as undercover stake-outs, posing as decoys in
public restrooms and parks, and spying on people in their own homes. 39 The
aggressive policing of same-sex intimacy and gender nonconformity raised the
question of what should be done with the apprehended offenders. Because
imprisonment might contribute to prison corruption and endanger future
victims once the offenders were released, California came up with more
unconventional solutions. Inspired by medical theorists who claimed that
"degenerate" classes could ruin the nation's gene pool, the legislature in 1909
enacted a law providing for the sterilization of any person convicted of two or
more sexual offenses if evidence indicated he or she was a "moral or sexual
pervert.' 40 Almost 7,000 Californians were sterilized by 1930, many of them
prostitutes and "homosexuals." 4 1 The number of annual sterilizations peaked in
1939, with 848.42 The United States Supreme Court discouraged this mania of
sterilization and castration when, in 1943, it struck down a discriminatory
35. See Eskridge, Construction, supra note 16, at 1110-11 app. 1 (sodomy arrests in nine
American cities, 1875-1941); id. at 1116-17 app. 2C (sex offense arrests in Richmond, 1875-
1940); id. at 1123-24 app. 3 ("degenerates" arraigned in New York City, 1915-48).
36. See, e.g., EDWARD STEVENSON, THE INTERSEXES (1908); Eskridge, Construction, supra
note 16, at 1112-13 app. 2B (sex offense arrests in San Francisco, 1860-1912).
37. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 374 app. Cl; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003, at 63-67 (2008)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS].
38. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 375 app. C2.
39. For examples of these activities from the increasing array of reported cases, see People
v. Jordan, 74 P.2d 519 (Cal. App. 1937); People v. Smink, 288 P. 873 (1930); People v. Parisi,
261 P. 1072 (1927).
40. 1909 Cal. Stat. 1093-94.
41. CALIF. STATE DEP'T MENTAL HYGIENE, STATISTICAL RES. BUR., STERILIZATION
OPERATIONS IN CALIFORNIA STATE HOSPITALS FOR THE MENTALLY ILL ETC., 1909-1960.
42. Id.
1792 [Vol. 97:1785
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1792 2009
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
Oklahoma law in Skinner v. Oklahoma.
43
Just as the sterilization and castration movement was slowing down,
partly in response to judicial pressure, policymakers hit upon what they
considered a more effective approach to so-called "degenerates," "perverts,"
and "homosexuals": remove them from civil society and "cure" them of their
underlying mental or physical disease. On the eve of World War II, state
legislatures began to enact a series of "sexual psychopath" laws. 4 The first
such laws were enacted in Michigan (1935), Illinois (1938), and California and
Minnesota (1939). California's law was the most moderate, aimed only at
defendants predisposed "to the commission of sexual offenses against
children. 'A5 In 1945, however, California removed the requirement that the sex
crimes had to be against children,46 freeing the State to send men convicted of
homosexual activities to hospitals for indefinite periods of time based on
doctors' testimony that those men were "inverts." 47 In 1951, the legislature
made failure to register as a sex offender (under a 1947 statute) one of the
grounds for initiating a psychopathic offender proceeding. 48 And in 1955, the
legislature explicitly provided that a "sexual psychopath" found not amenable
to "treatment" could still be held indefinitely by the State.4 9 After 1954, homo-
sexuals and other sex offenders falling under the sexual psychopath regime
were committed to Atascadero Hospital, known in gay circles as the "Dachau
for Queers." 50 One reason for this appellation was that inmates were subjected
to experimental therapies-electrical and pharmacological shock treatments in
addition to lobotomies-to "cure" them of their "sex perversion."
5 1
The vocabulary of the sexual psychopath laws reflected a shift in the
social understanding of same-sex intimacy and gender nonconformism.
Whereas in the 1880s and 1890s the perception of persons who failed to
conform to traditional gender norms shifted from sinners to biological
degenerates, in the first three decades of the twentieth century the medical and
social science discourse began to characterize the various types of
degenerates-including the homosexual-as persons who were sexually out of
control and predatory as a result of derailed psychosexual development. 52 The
43. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, sterilization law that
exempted white-collar crimes from this penalty); see VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS:
Skinner AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008) (historical analysis of Skinner).
44. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 94, 96.
45. 1939 Cal. Stat. 1783 § 5500.
46. 1945 Cal. Stat. 623 § 5500.
47. E.g., People v. Bamett, 166 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1946) (early application of California's
"sexual psychopath" law to treat a sexual "invert").
48. 1951 Cal. Stat. 4186 § 5501(a).
49. 1955 Cal. Stat. 1250.
50. John LaStala, Atascadero: Dachau for Queers?, ADVOCATE, Apr. 26, 1972, at 11.
51. Id. at 11, 13; Rob Cole, Inside Atascadero: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Treatment,
ADVOCATE, Oct. 11, 1972, at 5.
52. Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires ": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath,
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notion of homosexuals as predatory psychopaths who threatened the well-being
of society, especially children, saturated California's culture and emerged as a
powerful social fear and engine for further regulation after World War II.
53
No state better reflected the postwar antihomosexual "terror" than
California. In 1945, the legislature amended its habitual offender law, adding
consensual sodomy to the list of crimes for which a second offense
automatically meant a life prison sentence. 54 In 1947, California became the
first state to require convicted sex offenders (including people convicted of
consensual oral or anal sex) to register with the police in their home
jurisdictions. 55 In 1949, Governor Earl Warren called an "emergency" session
of the legislature to deal with the problem of sex offenders, and in January
1950 signed legislation doubling the penalties for sodomy; 56 creating an
alternate sentence for oral copulation; 57 and requiring registration (under the
1947 statute) of toilet loiterers and "lewd vagrants. 5 8 In 1952, Governor
Warren signed a law eliminating the maximum sentence for consensual
sodomy, thereby making it a potential life sentence. The maximum penalty for
consensual oral sex was fifteen years in prison.
59
Engaging in either one-time homosexual liaisons or long-term homosexu-
al relationships not only was a serious crime in California, but also excluded
the known homosexual from a variety of public rights and benefits. Under
California law, persons who engaged in "immoral conduct," explicitly includ-
ing sodomy and oral copulation, stood to lose state teaching jobs or teachers'
certificates, or both. Because most homosexuals prosecuted for these crimes
were able to plead to lesser offenses, in 1952 California expanded the bases for
revoking teaching certificates to include any conviction for "lewd vagrancy"
and "loitering at a public toilet," misdemeanors enforced almost exclusively
against homosexuals. In California, as in nearly all other states, "gross
immorality" was a statutory basis for disciplinary action against a host of other
licensed professionals, including lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, and
embalmers and funeral directors. 61 In 1955, the legislature enacted a law
1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83 (1987).
53. See ROBERT CORBER, HOMOSEXUALITY IN COLD WAR AMERICA: RESISTANCE TO THE
CRISIS OF MASCULINITY (1997); DAVID JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR
PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2003).
54. 1945 Cal. Stat. 1747-49.
55. 1947 Cal. Stat. 2562-63.
56. 1949 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess., 450-51 (Jan. 1950).
57. Id. at 512.
58. Id. at 476-77.
59. 1952 Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 380-82 (April 1952).
60. 1952 Cal. Stat. chs. 389-390. See generally Barry Copilow & Tom Coleman,
Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police
Department, ADVOCATE, Feb. 14, 1973, at 2-3, 24 ("lewd vagrancy" law enforced almost
exclusively against gay or bisexual men).
61. See E. CARRINGTON BOGGAN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 211-35 (1975) (lists of disciplinary actions).
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allowing regulators to close down bars that had become a "resort for ... sex
perverts" (or other undesirables).62
During this period of antihomosexual terror, California law presented
homosexuals as presumptive outlaws and enemies of the family. According to
the State, these people were depraved subhumans who were incapable of
human relationships and ruled by uncontrolled sexual urges and animal desires.
No systematic evidence existed to support any of these beliefs, which were
actually inconsistent with empirical studies such as the famous Kinsey Reports
on the sex lives of American men (1948) and women (1953). 63 Yet the
governor, the legislature, the bureaucracy, the police, the Department of
Education, and other agencies of the State embraced the stereotypes and, in
doing so, helped legitimize them.
In addition, virtually no one-not Governor Warren, not the legislature,
and not most citizens of the state-believed that the pervasively
antihomosexual state policies constituted "discrimination" any more than laws
prohibiting burglary or rape "discriminated" against burglars and rapists.
Governor Warren could understand how racism was a prejudice and how
apartheid constituted unsavory discrimination, but he was incapable of applying
the same concept to people he considered subhuman and criminal. Of course,
many southern racists saw African Americans much the same way Californians
viewed homosexuals: as a subhuman group whose intermixture could "corrupt"
public culture. 64 This illustrates how the concept of "discrimination" is as much
a social concept as it is a legal one: in a society that considers any kind of
sexual variation to be malignant, the mainstream population will not consider
treatment of sexual minorities to be discrimination.
California judges, operating under the same assumptions as everyone else,
did not stand up to the antigay policies of the 1940s and 1950s on
discrimination grounds. The judiciary did, however, draw lines that protected
homosexuals from some of the most extreme measures. Recall that the
California Supreme Court ruled in Boyle (1897) that the "crime against nature"
had not traditionally included oral sex and that the legislature needed to adopt
targeted laws to render this a crime. In Stoumen v. Reilly,6 5 the court ruled that
the State could not close down the famous Black Cat bar in San Francisco
62. 1955 Cal. Stat. 2230, § 24200(e).
63. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953);
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). See ESKRIDGE,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 109-27 (exploring the theoretical and practical
implications of the Kinsey Reports for sodomy reform after 1948).
64. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), remanded, 350 U.S. 891
(1955), affTd on remand, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (upholding
Virginia's antimiscegenation law on the ground that the statute was a rational means of protecting
against a "mongrel breed of citizens"). The Virginia Supreme Court essentially reasoned that the
state could not be compelled to "permit the corruption of blood" that would accompany marriage
of a white person and a person of color. Id.
65. 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
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simply because it was a place where "persons of known homosexual
tendencies" congregated. The legislature's 1955 statutory response was
declared unconstitutional in Vallerga v. Department of ABC.6 6 In Bielicki v.
Superior Court,67 the court invalidated a police practice of spying on men's
private activities within enclosed toilet stalls. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in One, Inc. v. Olesen68 that the postmaster for the City of Los Angeles
could not ban Los Angeles-based homophile literature from the mail.
None of the above decisions explicitly invoked equal protection concepts,
as few judges understood gay people as a "minority" subject to "discrimina-
tion"; any Perez-like court decision protecting "homosexuals" would have
triggered a socio-political backlash. To be blunt, so long as a society was
dedicated to the view that homosexuality was a malignant and even dangerous
variation from a fundamental norm, a public discourse of legal or social
discrimination was not possible. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court
performed a valuable function in prohibiting some governmental abuses that,
while longstanding in most cases, invaded personal liberties without any
substantiated public justification. Judges were virtually the only public officials
willing to stand up for a badly understood minority unfairly demonized by the
political process. Although the most prejudiced of citizens likely grumbled
about the foregoing judicial decisions, each decision applied principles that
have held up well over time, including the harm principle, cautioning against
criminalizing conduct that does not harm other people (as in Stoumen); the rule
of lenity, counseling against broad interpretations of vaguely-written criminal
prohibitions (as in Boyle); and an anticensorship norm (as in Vallerga and
One).
B. Stage 2: Toleration of the Homosexual Minority
One consequence of the terror practices just discussed was that some
"homosexuals" came to see their group as a "minority" whose outlaw status
and state persecution were unjustified. The "homophile" movement, classically
described by historian John D'Emilio, began and flourished as a modest grass-
roots social movement in California in the 1950s and 1960s. 69 The homophile
message was that homosexuality was a "tolerable" variation from the norm.
Conceding that heterosexuality could be preferred, homophile organizations
such as the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis argued that homo-
sexuality, even if a sad condition, was no threat to society, citizens, or the
66. 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959).
67. 371 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1962).
68. 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam).
69. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); see also FADERMAN &
TIMMONS, GAY L.A., supra note 17 (describing early Mattachine activists in Los Angeles);
JOHNSON, supra note 53, at 179-214.
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family. 70 Hence, these organizations reasoned, same-sex intimacy between con-
senting adults should not be a crime, homosexuals should not be excluded from
jobs such as teaching, and homosexuals should be able to form organizations,
socialize in gay bars, and publish gay-friendly tracts and literature. 7 Theirs was
primarily a plea for tolerance, not for full equality. In the 1960s, as more
lesbians and gay men lived openly in San Francisco and Los Angeles in partic-
ular, the original homophile organizations were joined by larger grass-roots
associations, and their message of tolerance began to have wider currency.
72
Although most Californians still harbored intense antihomosexual
prejudice, local political processes, fanned by state laws and policies that
remained on the books through the 1970s, became increasingly responsive to
the concerns of homophiles. For example, concerned citizens of all orientations
in San Francisco formed a Committee on Religion and Homosexuality. Its
signature event was a New Year's celebration that brought together a wide
range of citizens, male and female, rich and working-class, straight and gay and
transgendered. When the police broke up the 1965 New Year's celebration,
brutalizing homosexuals and even some heterosexuals, prominent citizens were
shocked by what they could see with their own eyes. The press fully reported
the incident and generated a fierce public reaction. 73 The 1965 New Year
confrontation created tremendous publicity for the homophile message that
decent people were treated indecently by state-sanctioned bigots and bullies.
The notorious San Francisco police were forced to curb their worst abuses,
while gay and lesbian groups set up hotlines and other mechanisms to report
and object to similar conduct.74 When police stepped up their harassment again
in 1970-71, gay groups not only protested to an increasingly receptive media,
but also went to the ballot box to elect a pro-gay sheriff; after that election,
antigay municipal harassment fell off.75 The homosexual community in Los
Angeles, the home of the original Mattachine Society, saw a similar pattern of
success in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
76
70. See, e.g., BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN, supra note 17, at 173-76 (examining the
tolerance-seeking philosophy of the early homophile associations after Mattachine purged its
leftist founders).
71. See, e.g., Daughters of Bilitis-Purpose, LADDER, Oct. 1956, at 1, 4; A Report from the
Legal Director, S.F. MATTACHINE NEWSL., Dec. 1955.
72. See BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN, supra note 17, at 209-12 (describing bar culture and
other associations in San Francisco that were successful in garnering some local support for gay
tolerance, even in light of "gayola" and other scandals revealing police corruption and abuse);
FADERMAN & TIMMONS, GAY L.A., supra note 17, at 141-58 (providing similar account of Los
Angeles, but later in time).
73. For first-hand accounts of the police raid, see ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990, at 135-36 (1992).
74. Sasha Gregory-Lewis, Building a Gay Politic: The San Francisco Model, ADVOCATE,
Oct. 8, 1975, at 27, 32.
75. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO
BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 148-63 (1999).
76. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
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Notwithstanding political success at these local levels, reform at the state
level proved impossible in the 1960s, even for an issue about which experts
largely agreed: the repeal of California's consensual sodomy and oral
copulation laws. The American Law Institute (ALl or the "Institute") had in
1955 voted to exclude consensual sodomy from the Model Penal Code (which
the Institute ultimately adopted in 1962). The Institute's reasoning was that
consensual sodomy laws inevitably engendered police corruption and arbitrary
enforcement and that invading people's private consensual sexual activities did
not advance the public interest. 77 Between 1964 and 1967, the California legis-
lature's Penal Code Revision Project drew from the Model Penal Code as it
drafted new sex crime provisions. Following the ALI's reasoning, project direc-
78tor Arthur Sherry proposed to deregulate consensual sodomy. Police officers
later told the legislature that the laws prohibiting consensual sodomy and oral
copulation did not contribute to the public good and should be repealed.79
Yet the legislature made no changes to these laws. The probable reason
was that sodomy reform would have been understood as "promoting homo-
sexuality," anathema to the legislature and the governor. Accordingly, even
though California's sex crime laws were some of the most outdated in the
nation, antihomosexual animus prevented the legislature from acting. The
discretion these laws vested in the police impelled California judges to respond.
In 1966, the California Court of Appeal declared the public indecency law void
for vagueness.80 In the early 1970s, several trial court judges declared the
consensual oral copulation law unconstitutional as a violation of the privacy
right and the rule of law.
81
In 1975, the legislature responded by repealing the consensual sodomy
and oral copulation laws in a major revision of the state's sex crimes. 82 The
legislature's action was important and revolutionary: it removed the legal basis
for considering "homosexuals" as per se outlaws and did so in a democratically
accountable way, after open debate and a vote by elected representatives. Other
features of the legislature's deliberation are also notable. First, a unique array
of political factors permitted sodomy reform to pass through the legislature,
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, i961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 840-42 (1997).
77. On the Model Penal Code's suggested deletion of consensual sodomy laws and its
rationale, see ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 118-24.
78. Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, Penal Code Revision
Project, Tentative Draft No. 1 - Division 11: Crimes Against Sexual Morality, Public Decency,
and the Family (1967).
79. Police Opinion Questionnaire Completed-Here Are the Results, LAW ENFORCEMENT
J., July 1973 (copy available in the Assembly's Republican Caucus File for A.B. 489 [1973
Session]).
80. In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 701 (Cal. App. 1966).
81. Ruling Hits California's Oral Sex Law, ADVOCATE, Oct. 11, 1972, at 1; San Diego
Judge Strikes Felony Oral Copulation Law, ADVOCATE, Apr. 11, 1973, at 19.
82. 1975 Cal. Stat. 131-36.
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namely, the sweeping gains made by forward-looking legislators in the 1974
election and the sponsorship of the bill by Assemblyman Willie Brown and
Senator George Moscone, two heterosexual politicians who championed gay
rights. Even with all these stars aligned, the bill barely squeaked through in the
Senate, whose 20-20 deadlock was broken by Lieutenant Governor Mervyn
Dymally, a veteran of the civil rights movement like Brown and Moscone.
83
Second, the sponsors realized that a key to their argument would be to
show how the consensual oral copulation law threatened heterosexual couples,
not just homosexuals. Many legislators were astounded to learn that oral sex
was a crime in the state, and that knowledge made it much easier for them to
vote for reform, especially when their girlfriends or wives were sitting in the
galleries on the day of the vote.
84
Third, the public arguments against the bill included displays of
antihomosexual stereotyping and animus. Senator Alfred Song, chair of the
Judiciary Committee, was appalled at the anti-Semitic and racist (as well as
homophobic) language used by Californians opposed to sex crime reform that
advantaged homosexuals. 85 Some Senate opponents of the bill argued that sex
crime reform amounted to state promotion of homosexuality, which one oppo-
nent described on the Senate floor as conduct that God told the Israelites should
be punished by death (Leviticus 20:13). Other opponents warned that homo-
sexuals spread venereal disease and therefore were a public health menace; that
courts would extend the bill's protections to "the beaches, the bushes, and the
restrooms"; and that impressionable children would receive the message that
homosexuality is "okay.9
86
Ironically, the repeal of the consensual oral copulation and sodomy laws
did not remove the primary bases for police harassment of gay men and
lesbians in California, namely, the "vag lewd" law (Penal Code section 647(a)).
Studies documented that the vag lewd law was almost exclusively applied
against homosexuals, that it often justified police intrusions into people's
private activities, and that it occasioned blackmail and other abuses. 87 There
was, however, strong law-and-order opposition to repealing the vag lewd law in
1975, and so Assemblyman Brown made no effort to repeal that law in his sex
83. For an account of the legislative maneuvering, see ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE
PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 197-201.
84. Interview by Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., with Willie Brown, former
Assemblyman, in San Francisco, Jan. 10, 2005.
85. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 198-99 (providing account of
the reasons advanced by opponents of sodomy repeal).
86. Sex Bill Passes in Historic Senate Tie-Breaker, ADVOCATE, May 21, 1975, at 4;
Johanna Neuman, Battle Over Consenting Sex Rages, Ends in Draw, L.A. DAILY J., May 2, 1975,
at 1, 20.
87. See Barry Copilow & Tom Coleman, Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California
Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department, ADVOCATE, Feb. 14, 1973, at 2-3, 24; Los
ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, UPDATE: ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 647(A) OF THE CALIFORNIA PENAL
CODE (1974).
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crime reform bill. 88 Legislators concerned about the legality of heterosexual
intimate activities (including their own) felt that the vag lewd law applied only
to homosexuals, and they could defend their votes to repeal consensual sodomy
by pointing to the antihomosexual provisions left in the Code. Moreover, the
vag lewd law was aimed at "public" rather than "private" activities, always a
more popular and better-justified basis for legal regulation.
The California Supreme Court considered the application of section
647(a) in Pryor v. Municipal Court.89 Rejecting the State's argument that the
vag lewd law was a longstanding and unexceptional application of its police
power to maintain public order, the court ruled that its vagueness invited
enforcement against consensual activities that posed no legitimate threat to
public order, namely, invitations and overtures by lesbians and gay men to one
another. 90 The court further found that the law was applied in a discriminatory
manner, targeting gay men. 91 Rather than striking down the law on due process
vagueness grounds, however, the court held that section 647(a) should be
interpreted narrowly, as applying only to solicitation of sexual conduct in a
public place and to sexual touching the actor had good reason to believe would
be offensive to the other person.92 Although at the time Pryor served as a
stinging rebuke to local enforcement of the vag lewd law, its accommodation of
public decency and private intimacy has proven to be a lasting resolution.
The legislature also did not dare support open homosexuality in the
workforce, and so this issue, too, was left to the administrative and judicial
branches of government. In a landmark opinion, the California Supreme Court
ruled in Morrison v. State Board of Education93 that the State could not
discharge a teacher for once engaging in private homosexual conduct. The
court restricted the statutory "immoral conduct" disqualification to activities
impairing a teacher's pedagogical effectiveness, meaning there had to be a
nexus between a disqualifying factor and the person's ability to do his or her
job.94 In 1977, the court extended Morrison to protect a teacher who had been
arrested (pre-Pryor) for soliciting an undercover policeman and charged with
violating the vag lewd law.
95
88. See Letter from California Peace Officers' Ass'n et al. to Hon. Willie Brown, Jr. (Feb.
28, 1975) (objecting to sex crime reform that would allow "homosexuals" to solicit other men for
sodomy); Letter from George H. Murphy, Legislative Counsel of California, to Hon. Willie
Brown, Jr., (Mar. 5, 1975) (opining that Brown's bill would not affect the vag lewd law barring
sexual solicitation). These letters come from the Senate Committee files for the 1975 sex crimes
law.
89. 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979).
90. Id. at 643-44.
91. Id. at 644.
92. Id. at 645-48.
93. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
94. Id. at 379-87.
95. See Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977).
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The notion of allowing lesbians and gay men to teach in the public
schools was alarming to many California parents. The voters had an opportuni-
ty to override Morrison in 1978. The famous Briggs Initiative would have
required the discharge of any teacher who advocated or encouraged "private or
public homosexual activity" if such advocacy was likely to come to the
attention of schoolchildren. 96 Former governor Ronald Reagan and then-
governor Jerry Brown opposed the Initiative, and it was defeated. A year later,
Governor Brown issued an executive order barring sexual orientation discrimi-
nation against state employees.
97
These were milestones in the transition of California from a state where
homosexuals were degraded as outlaws to a state where lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals were tolerated. For the first time in its history, California law
reflected an understanding that state persecution of gay people could be
"discrimination" analogous to the State's longtime persecution of people
having Japanese or Chinese ancestries. That this notion was then conceivable
did not mean that most Californians or even most legislators believed that
anything should be done to protect people they had learned to view with disgust
and moral disapproval. Based upon a review of the legislative culture in the
mid-1970s and conversations with then-assemblyman Willie Brown, I do not
believe the California legislature would have enacted laws accomplishing what
the California Supreme Court and Governor Jerry Brown did in this period. By
protecting sexual minorities in some very basic ways, the court and the
governor reversed the burden of political inertia. Before their actions, gay
people had no rights against the operation of prejudice. That same prejudice
disabled gay people from securing rights through legislation or initiatives. But
after judges and the chief executive gave gay people some basic rights, popular
or legislative majorities would have had to act affirmatively to return gay
people to their unprotected status. This proved hard to do, as the Briggs
Initiative suggested.
Moreover, by reversing the burden of inertia, the California Supreme
Court and the governor created conditions for falsification of stereotypes.
Popular fears, long expressed in the law, that homosexuals prey on school-
children proved unfounded in the wake of Morrison. Similarly, myths that
homosexuals disrupted workplaces, accepted by the federal as well as state
governments, failed to materialize after Governor Brown's order. By creating a
tolerant space for gay people within the state itself, the California Supreme
Court and the governor gave gay people opportunities to contribute to public
projects, sometimes as openly gay people. This was an educational experience
96. 1978 Cal. Ballot, Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (operative language paraphrased in text); see
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1702-06 (1993) (discussion
of Briggs Initiative).
97. Office of the Governor of California, Executive Order No. B-54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979).
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The legislature was still capable of expressing positive disapproval of
homosexuality and was sometimes eager to do so. After the sodomy repeal and
legislative actions in 1971 made the state's domestic relations law substantially
gender-neutral, the County Clerks Association became alarmed because some
gay activists maintained that the law now permitted "homosexual marriages."
99
In 1977, legislators voted by overwhelming margins to amend the domestic
relations law to make clear that civil marriage was limited to heterosexual adult
relationships.100 The rhetoric of the brief same-sex marriage debate was signifi-
cant: opponents argued not only that same-sex marriage was inconsistent with
the traditional definition of marriage, but also that state recognition would
promote homosexuality and destroy marriage and the family. 0 l
C. Stage 3: Equal Citizenship for LGBT Persons
By the 1960s, there were openly gay and lesbian citizens who maintained
that homosexuality was not just a tolerable variation from the norm of
heterosexuality. Instead, they suggested there was no single norm, and homo-
sexuality was simply a benign variation. Jos6 Sarria, the famous waiter at the
Black Cat (the gay bar the State spent millions of dollars trying to close), ran
for a seat on San Francisco's Board of Supervisors in 1961. His platform was
"Gay is Good."'
10 2
That platform reflected the thinking of emerging gay activists on both
coasts of the United States. In Washington, D.C., for instance, gay-is-good
activist Frank Kameny was mounting a vigorous campaign against the regime
of police entrapment, distribution of arrest lists, and punitive screening of the
military and public service that had ended his career in astronomy for the103
Pentagon. Weary of police bullying, bar raids, and smears by journalists as
well as police, California homosexuals in the San Francisco and Los Angeles
bar cultures began to express solidarity.' 04 In the limited and unstable sphere of
98. For a collection of stories accounting for the price paid by closeted lesbian and gay
teachers, and the liberating effect of being free from discrimination, see ONE TEACHER IN TEN:
GAY AND LESBIAN EDUCATORS TELL THEIR STORIES (Kevin Jennings, ed., 1994).
99. The documentary legislative history of the clerks' proposal to clarify state marriage
law is found in Record on Appeal at 1023-1182, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)
(Case No. S 1479990).
100. 1977 Cal. Stat. 131.
101. See Senate Approves Measure Banning Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1977, at
B33 (accounts of the legislative debate).
102. BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN, supra note 17, at 212; Guy Strait, The Nightingale, S.F.
NEWS, Dec. 23, 1963, at 4 (describing Sarria's campaign and his "Gay is Good" platform).
103. On Kameny's activism, see David K. Johnson, Homosexual Citizens: Washington's
Gay Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter 1994-95, at 45.
104. BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN, supra note 17, at 200-36 (Gay is Good movement in San
Francisco, 1950s-60s); FADERMAN & TIMMONS, GAY L.A., supra note 17, at 148-58 (Los
Angeles, 1960s).
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dialogue that the regulatory and police state afforded them at the time,
emerging activists on both coasts posited a new understanding: gay men and
lesbians are not degraded and abnormal, but are good and normal. The 5,613
votes cast for Sarria in the 1961 election reflected this point of view. 105
During the 1960s, modest but increasing numbers of gay men and lesbians
rejected the Daughters-Mattachine strategy of acquiescing in the inferiority of
homosexuality and asserted that there was nothing wrong with being
"homosexual." Experts emerged as important allies in this effort. For example,
the National Institute for Mental Health's influential 1969 report concluded that
homosexuality was neither a mental disease nor a defect and that it was
homophobia, instead, that constituted a social menace and a threat to the public
good. 0 6 Civil liberties groups, which began to intervene on behalf of complain-
ants such as Kameny in police entrapment cases in the late 1950s, became
significant, if sometimes reluctant, players in mediating conflicts over the scope
and intensity of police intrusion into private lives.' 
07
These new gay voices (mostly baby boomers), fed up with the "degrading
of [their] personalities by the state," proclaimed: "Merely to live, we must
assert ourselves as homosexuals," and "accept it or not, we will force our way
into open society; you will have to acknowledge us."'1 08 The gay-is-good
philosophy required lesbians and gay men to "come out" of their "closets," not
only for their own emotional well-being, but also to demonstrate to an ignorant
society that homosexuals were human beings with lives, serious relationships,
and job capabilities. Political progress, they thought, was only possible if
significant numbers of citizens participated in the public sphere as openly gay
people. The political goal of the gay-is-good strategists was legal equality, not
just tolerance and freedom from police terror. 1°9 Early thinkers like Harry Hay,
the founder of Mattachine in Los Angeles, appropriated the civil rights
movement's idea that homosexuals were a "minority group" subject to
"discrimination" because of emotional prejudice and mental stereotypes.°
10
As more LGBT people came out of the closet, many left rural areas and
small towns where they feared for their economic security and physical safety.
They came in droves to San Francisco, Los Angeles, and other cities with size-
able gay populations. In the wake of the June 1969 Stonewall protests in New
105. Strait, supra note 102, at 4.
106. TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT
(1969).
107. See ESKRIrDE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 152-58 (ambivalent
ACLU attitude toward the rights of gay people in the 1950s evolves into an increasingly
supportive stance in the 1960s).
108. Seymour Krim, Revolt of the Homosexual, MATrACHINE REV., May 1959, at 4-5, 9.
109. For an early formal espousal of the full equality goal for gay people, see WASH.
MATrACHINE SOC'Y CONST. art. II, § l(a)-(c) (1962).
110. Harry Hay, Preliminary Concepts: International Bachelors' Fraternal Order for
Peace and Social Dignity (1950), reprinted in RADICALLY GAY: GAY LIBERATION IN THE WORDS
OF ITS FOUNDER 63-76 (Will Roscoe, ed., 1996).
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York City, III thousands of urban Californians demanded equal treatment by the
State and government protection against private discrimination. In 1978, under
the sponsorship of Mayor George Moscone (the senate sponsor of sodomy
reform in 1975) and Supervisor Harvey Milk, San Francisco became one of the
first large cities in America to adopt a law protecting against sexual orientation
discrimination in employment. 112 However, the California legislature was
unprepared to extend equality protections to gay people, especially after Dade
County and several other local governments saw their antidiscrimination ordi-
nances overturned by popular referenda in 1977-78.13 On November 27, 1978,
San Francisco Supervisor Dan White (the only vote against the earlier anti-
discrimination ordinance) assassinated Mayor Moscone and Supervisor Milk, a
political act that shocked the lesbian and gay community into greater activism.
In the wake of the Milk and Moscone assassinations, the California
Supreme Court again reversed the burden of inertia, in Gay Law Students
Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 114 Employees sued PT&T
for discriminating against gay people in hiring, firing, and promotion. Although
not emphasized in the plaintiffs' complaint, the court read the California Labor
Code's prohibition of employer interference with employee "political activi-
ties" to include employer discipline of gay employees for being "out of the
closet":
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a
political activity .... The aims of the struggle for homosexual rights,
and the tactics employed, bear a close analogy to the continuing
struggle for civil rights waged by blacks, women, and other minorities.
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling that
homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual worker must
conceal from his employer and his fellow workers. Consequently one
important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce
homosexual individuals to "come out of the closet," acknowledge their
sexual preferences, and to associate with others in working for equal
rights.l5
111. In June 1969, hundreds of LGBT people rioted in and outside the Stonewall Inn in
New York City. These riots stimulated large numbers of LGBT people to "come out of the closet"
and demand political rights all over the country. The best introduction is DAVID CARTER,
STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION (2004) (recently made into a
documentary film).
112. See RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
HARVEY MILK (1985).
113. See JAMES T. SEARS, REBELS, RUBYFRUIT, AND RHINESTONES: QUEERING SPACE IN
THE STONEWALL SOUTH 226-45 (2001) (detailed account of the 1977 Dade County Referendum).
114. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
115. Id.at610.
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Although dissenting colleagues criticized the majority for stretching the
statutory language to fit a progressive social vision in PT&T, 1 6 the time had
come for legal recognition of the equality principle. The court led, and over the
next decade the political process followed.
After PT&T, the city councils of Los Angeles (1979), Oakland (1984),
Santa Monica (1984), West Hollywood (1984), Sacramento (1986), Long
Beach (1987), and San Diego (1990) enacted new ordinances barring private
job discrimination based on sexual orientation.' 17 Each of these cities also
prohibited discrimination in municipal employment. Governor Brown adopted
a similar policy for state employees in 1979, and in 1992 the legislature
amended the Labor Code to add an explicit protection for employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation." 8 The same pattern followed in
public accommodations discrimination. Lower courts construed the Unruh
Civil Rights Act to bar sexual orientation discrimination by public accommoda-
tions,' 19 and the legislature codified that principle by statute in 2005.120
In less than a generation, California had moved from a state where
homosexuals were an outlaw class to one where both municipal and state
governments decriminalized same-sex intercourse and solicitation, opened civil
service and teaching jobs to openly gay people, and announced that antigay
discrimination in workplaces and places of public accommodation was illegal.
California's evolving policy involved all the institutions of government, with
judges, administrators, legislators, and even some enforcement agencies under
reined-in entrapment protocols and post-arrest due process provisions set by
appellate courts contributing to the instantiation of nondiscrimination in the
workplace.
To be sure, these measures had their limits. Police still harassed
homosexuals; antidiscrimination laws were underenforced, especially at the
municipal level; and openly gay people were subject to violence, hate crimes,
and abusive harassment in schools and the workplace. Most importantly, as gay
people were forming relationships and families in unprecedented numbers, they
faced a family law regime whose protections were uncertain. Committed
couples wanted state recognition of their relationships, and couples raising
children wanted both partners to have rights as legal parents. Given the
116. Id. at 618 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's application of the labor
code's protection of "political activity" to the "homosexuals"' complaint); see also id. at 613-18
(trenchant criticism of the majority's expansive interpretation of state constitutional and statutory
protections as applied to "homosexuals").
117. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 356 (App. B2).
118. See Executive Order No. B-54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979) (barring sexual orientation
discrimination in state employment); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (2003) (2009 Supp.) (barring
discrimination because of sexual orientation in private as well as public workplaces).
119. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289 (1984) (interpreting Unruh Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51, to bar public accommodations from discriminating based on sexual orientation).
120. 2005 Cal. Stat. ch. 420 § 3.
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legislature's 1977 rebuff of same-sex marriage, gay activists in San Francisco
devised an alternate institution, the "domestic partnership," that would provide
both recognition and some benefits for same-sex couples. 2 1 San Francisco's
Board of Supervisors passed a domestic partnership law in 1982, but Mayor
Dianne Feinstein vetoed it on the ground that it "mimicked" marriage, which
she considered off-limits to homosexuals. 22
Two years later, the Berkeley City Council adopted the first operative
municipal domestic partnership ordinance, which ultimately allowed city
employees to obtain health benefits for their same-sex partners. 23 Similar laws
were adopted in West Hollywood (1985), Santa Cruz (1986), Los Angeles
(1988), San Francisco (1989 [revoked by referendum], adopted again in 1990),
Sacramento (1992), San Diego (1994), Oakland (1996), and Long Beach
(1997)."' In 1994, the California legislature passed a similar domestic
partnership law, only to have it vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson, on the ground
that it would be a "foot in the door" for same-sex marriage. 25 Five years after
that, the legislature passed an even more extensive domestic partnership law,
and this time the governor (Gray Davis, a Democrat who succeeded Wilson)
signed it.126 Although the voters adopted the Knight Initiative in 2000, which
defined marriage as one man, one woman for purposes of California law, the
legislature in 2003 extended the benefits of statewide domestic partnership to
include almost all the legal benefits, and in some cases the legal obligations,
accorded civil marriage. 27 In the proposed California Marriage License
Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, the legislature recognized that the State's
constitutional obligation to treat lesbian and gay couples the same as straight
couples was not met by the domestic partnership law, which "den[ied] them the
unique public recognition and affirmation that civil marriage confers on
[heterosexual] couples.
' 128
While legislators took the lead in recognizing lesbian and gay unions,
judges took the lead in recognizing lesbian and gay families. A generation ago,
openly lesbian and gay parents often lost custody and even visitation rights to
121. Interview by Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., with Matt Coles, in New York City
(Dec. 29, 2004) (account of the domestic partnership idea by Coles, who was an author and
supporter of the idea when he was a gay rights activist in San Francisco).
122. San Francisco Mayor Says No to Gay Marriage, BLADE, Jan. 26, 1983, at 9.
123. City of Berkeley, Policy Establishing Domestic Partnership Registration (1984), cited
and discussed in Craig Bowman & Blake Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
SocialAnalysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1189 (1992).
124. See id. at 1189-95 (identifying and discussing these ordinances); Raymond O'Brien,
Domestic Partnership: Recognition Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163 (1995) (similar).
125. Daniel Weintraub & Bettina Boxall, Ballot Fallout Expected from Wilson's Veto, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at 3.
126. 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 588.
127. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409-10 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the 2000 Knight
Initiative); 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 421 (expanding domestic partnership rights, benefits, and duties).
128. A.B. 849, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. Calif. Legis. Governor Schwarzenegger successfully
vetoed this bill in 2005, and a similar one in 2007. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 410 n.17.
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straight ex-spouses because of social stereotyping of homosexuals as
irresponsible and sexually predatory. 129 For the last twenty-five years, gay and
(especially) lesbian couples have been conceiving and rearing children within
their committed relationships. Those couples rearing children have sought to
create parental rights for both parents through "second-parent adoption,"
whereby the second parent adopts the child (whether biological or adoptive) of
the first parent.130 Lower-court judges in California have confirmed between
10,000 and 20,000 such adoptions. 131 The California Supreme Court ratified
second-parent adoptions in Sharon S. v. Superior Court. 32 Justice Kathryn
Werdegar's majority opinion rejected arguments that state recognition of
lesbian and gay families was inconsistent with civil marital values and
concluded that lesbian and gay families served the fundamental purpose of
adoption law: the best interests of children.' 33 Following the courts, the
legislature's 2003 domestic partnership amendments recognized registered
domestic partners as full coparents, just as state law has long recognized
different-sex married stepparents.'
34
The Marriage Cases, therefore, can be viewed as the culmination of
several generations of normative debate about the civil status of sexual
minorities. Each of the court's three key holdings was a confirmation of gay
people's near-equal citizenship. First, and most important, the ruling that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification is a direct rejection of both the old view
that homosexuality is a malignant variation from the norm and the newer view
that homosexuality is a tolerable variation on heterosexuality, the official state
norm. After the Marriage Cases, there was no legally preferred "norm" with
respect to sexual orientation. Second, the court's ruling that the long-
recognized fundamental "right to marry" applies to lesbians, gay men,
bisexuals, and transgendered persons just as it does to straight persons is an
important corollary and reinforcement of the first point. For the first time in
American history, an appellate court found the courage-or the logic-to reject
the tautological claim that a "right to marry" has no relevance to unions that
most people do not consider valid marriages. Third, the court's overruling of
the legislature's and Proposition 22's discrimination against same-sex couples
in marriage recognition removed the biggest discrimination against gay people
in the state codes.
129. E.g., Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 248 (Ct. App. 1959) (holding that
evidence of the wife's sexual relationship with another woman was relevant to determination of
child custody in divorce proceedings).
130. See Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian and Other Non-Traditional Families, 90 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990) (explaining the concept of "second parent adoption" and urging judges to interpret
adoption laws to accommodate children raised by same-sex couples).
131. Jennifer Pizer, What About the Children?, ADVOCATE, Nov. 9, 2001, at 1.
132. 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
133. Compare id. at 568-70, with id. at 582-87 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b), (g).
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II
EQUALITY PRACTICE: EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE IN A PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY
What motivated California judges to repeatedly protect sexual minorities
from the full force of oppressive laws and practices? Why did the protections
not come earlier? Why did those judges proceed so cautiously? These questions
defy simple answers, but the following account is only moderately complex.
The goal of a pluralist democracy is to induce all salient social groups to invest
in state political and legal processes. 135 In such a system, judges can play the
important role of helping to transition new or emerging groups into the legal
and political system without unduly alienating existing groups. 136 One great
internal danger to a pluralist democracy is primordial, high-stakes politics,
where groups in the grip of emotional hysteria use the State to exclude,
penalize, or hurt members of a hated or feared group. This chaotic brand of
politics can undermine or even destroy a democracy by fueling private feuds,
intensifying inter-group animus, and inducing some groups or members to
forsake politics in favor of extra-political mechanisms such as violence. 1
38
Judges can ameliorate such transitions, thereby contributing to the opera-
tion of a pluralist democracy, by blocking measures that injure a salient group
without a currently-justified public justification.' 39 Thus, the most basic job of
the judiciary is libertarian: ensure that all citizens are treated fairly as a matter
of process. With regard to equal protection, this approach explains why the
primary tools of analysis are heightened scrutiny when the legislature is
deploying suspect classifications that tend to reflect stakes-raising animus
rather than public-regarding criteria, or infringing fundamental rights (deep
civic harms to the minority). On the other hand, judicial decisions themselves
can raise the stakes of politics, as when judges seek closure on an issue that is
of deep concern to a popular majority or significant minority. 140 This explains
and justifies judges' tendency to defer to the political process on most policy
issues and their disinclination to close the door on political discussion when the
135. ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT (1967); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734
(1983).
136. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
137. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36-37 (1991); see also STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 202-08, 222-27 (1995)
(advocating "gag rules" to lower the stakes of primordial conversations).
138. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 137, at 26-37; Miller, supra note 135, at 742.
139. See e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning segregated schools
because they have the effect of impeding the ability of an important social group to benefit from
public education, understood as fundamental to American democracy).
140. This is the most legitimate criticism of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g.,
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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population is intensely divided.141 In short, the judicial role is to avoid the
Scylla of minority persecution without running into the Charybdis of repudiat-
ing intense policy preferences of the majority. Judges navigate these waters
through equality practice: pressing the equal treatment norm gently, in
decisions that push the law just a little, with an invitation for popular
feedback. 42 If the feedback is positive (gay people flourish, traditionalist
worries do not materialize), then judges or other officials might push the law a
little more the next time, until there is a stable equilibrium of formal equality or
something close to it.
This model of judicial decisionmaking is mainly normative: it is, I argue,
what judges should be doing in constitutional cases. But it also has great
descriptive power: this is what California judges have actually been doing in
constitutional cases. During the long period of California's history when homo-
sexuals were considered subhuman social outcasts and legal outlaws, they were
not a salient social group or part of the pluralist political process. In that period,
there was simply no equality jurisprudence applicable to gay people, although
the California and U.S. Supreme Courts did apply basic liberty-protecting
assurances, such as due process and free speech, to them. This libertarian
jurisprudence set minimum standards of decency that even despised persons
were assured. It was modestly stakes-lowering, because it offset some of the
bitterness that unfairly persecuted persons and their friends and families would
harbor as a result of harsh treatment. These libertarian protections also assured
gay people some space-bars and clubs, the mail, journals and newsletters, and
associations like Mattachine and the Daughters-in which they could begin to
cohere as a social group.
Once gay people started to cohere as a visible social group and to be
politically active in California cities in the 1960s, mainstream attitudes began to
change and legal reform became tangible. 143 It was harder for most straight
people to consider all homosexuals as subhuman, predatory, or degenerate once
they knew and worked with openly gay people. The implication is that those
Californians who knew and worked with gay people tended to be doubtful that
antihomosexual policies really served the public interest, and many prejudiced
Californians became open to the possibility that such policies "went too far."
The existence of a discernible and politically engaged gay community became
apparent to thoughtful observers, including judges who entertained a series of
cases involving lesbian and gay citizens. Judicial decisions criminalizing police
enforcement of cross-dressing, public indecency, and lewd vagrancy laws went
141. See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Court unanimously
declining to announce a constitutional right to die, as body politic is just beginning serious debate
on this important issue).
142. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 10.
143. See BOYD, WIDE-OPEN TOWN, supra note 17, at 194-236 (San Francisco, 1960s);
FADERMAN & TIMMONS, GAY L.A., supra note 17, at 148-218 (Los Angeles, 1964-75).
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beyond the legislature's sodomy reform: they got the State off the backs of gay
people for private, consensual activities and drew no rebuke from the political
process. California Supreme Court decisions protecting lesbian and gay
schoolteachers against arbitrary discipline drew more political attention but
also survived.
After the 1979 riots in San Francisco reacting to the light criminal
punishment for Harvey Milk's assassin, the California Supreme Court and the
governor banned private and public job discrimination against gay people.'
44
This was a direct response to a social movement that demanded an end to
antigay persecution. As before, the court pushed the political process beyond
the legislature. But these decisions allowed the possibility of legislative
override and popular response through the increasingly used initiative process.
The (failed) Briggs Initiative of 1978 was an example of this phenomenon.
The new antidiscrimination policies fuelled an increasingly assertive gay
rights movement, even as the AIDS epidemic was contributing to an antigay
backlash. 45 By the 1990s, many were coming out as gay couples and gay
parents. Judges accommodated the parents by interpreting the state adoption
law to allow two women or two men to be legal parents, 146 while local govern-
ments and the state legislature created domestic partnership laws. 147 Together,
judges and legislators performed the difficult task of integrating the new social
group into the state's legal structure while taking pains not to alienate
traditionalist citizens who viewed gay people with unease. The 2000 Knight
Initiative was significant in not addressing parental rights or domestic
partnerships, but it did reflect a popular judgment about gay marriage: no state
recognition. Yet eight years later the California Supreme Court overrode both
the 1977 statute banning same-sex marriage and the 2000 initiative on
constitutional grounds. This raises the question: What happened between 2000
and 2008 that motivated the court to act after having deftly avoided stakes-
raising changes for the previous fifty years?
In my view, the California Supreme Court would not have required same-
sex marriage in 2000, even though the exact legal arguments accepted by the
144. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979) (interpret-
ing state labor code to bar private employment discrimination because of sexual orientation);
Exec. Order No. B-54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979) (barring state employment discrimination because of
sexual orientation).
145. On the complicated politics of antidiscrimination and AIDS, see ESKRIDGE,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 201-28 (partially attributing renewed antigay attitudes
to AIDS, 1980s), 274-98 (describing easing of AIDS backlash and renewed gay-tolerant and even
gay-friendly attitudes).
146. Decades of lower court opinions were confirmed. See Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d
554 (Cal. 2003).
147. For examples of domestic partnership registries created in California, see 1999 Cal.
Stat. ch. 588 (statewide, expanded in 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 421); Bowman & Cornish, supra note
123, at 1189-95 (county and municipal registries).
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court in 2008 were available in a detailed analysis published in 1996. 48 The
arguments had not changed, but the ability of the judicial audience to under-
stand them or to openly agree with them had changed because the social and
legal context had changed. This Part will show how the arguments accepted by
the California Supreme Court (and one that was not accepted) were made
possible because of the social and political changes between 2000 and 2008. By
exploring this legal sociology, one can understand both the underlying juris-
prudence of the Marriage Cases and something about the socio-legal dynamics
of constitutional law.
A. The Fundamental Right to Marry: New Identities, New Rights
As a matter of jurisprudence, the precedent most analogous to the
Marriage Cases was the California Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Perez v.
Sharp.149 In one of the boldest judicial decisions of the twentieth century, the
court struck down an antimiscegenation statute that had been part of
California's family law since statehood and that had recently been expanded to
override a lower court decision allowing a Caucasian-Filipino marriage.1 50 No
American appellate court had invalidated an antimiscegenation law before
Perez, and no appellate court would do so again until the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Loving v. Virginia almost twenty years later. 15 1 In Loving and subse-
quent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to marry,
applicable not only to different-race couples, but also to deadbeat dads who
have not paid their legal alimony or child support obligations 152 and to
convicted rapists and murderers in prison. 53
As I have argued elsewhere, the fundamental right to marry should apply
to lesbian and gay couples, putting a high burden of proof on the State to justify
their exclusion.1 54 In a civilized society, it is a scandal that rapists have a
recognized right to marry and committed lesbian couples raising children do
not. However, before the Marriage Cases, every American appellate court
addressing this issue had ruled that the "right to marry" did not apply to same-
148. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE] (arguing that same-sex marriage is an
idea whose time has come, and that courts ought to strike down laws barring lesbian and gay
couples from getting married). The arguments accepted by the California Supreme Court in 2008
were set forth in the book. Id. at 123-52 (arguing that fundamental right to marry applies to
lesbian and gay couples), 172-82 (arguing that sexual orientation ought to be a suspect
classification and thus an independent basis for strict scrutiny).
149. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor, J., plurality opinion).
150. 1933 Cal. Stat. 1472-73.
151. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
152. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
153. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (no written dissent from the proposition that the
fundamental right to marry applies to men in prison for life; Justice Scalia took no public position
on this issue, neither dissenting nor joining the majority opinion).
154. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 148, at 123-52.
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sex couples.1 55 It is very probable that the California Supreme Court itself
would have followed the uniform judicial approach in 2000, perhaps
unanimously, but they did not in 2008. What had changed was perceived gay
identity, the legal rights of gay people and gay couples in California, and
heterosexual identity.
First, the notion of lesbians and gay men as committed spouses raising
children was an idea incomprehensible to large majorities of Americans in
2000.156 "Gay marriage" was then an oxymoron; although several Scandinavian
countries had recognized "registered partnerships" for same-sex couples, no
modem western state had recognized lesbian or gay unions as "marriages." By
2008, that had changed. Several countries had formally recognized same-sex
marriage: The Netherlands (2001), Belgium (2003), Canada and Spain (2005),
and South Africa (2005-06).157 Notably, in the U.S. so had the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts (2003). 15' Linguistically at least, for many Americans the
term "gay marriage" was no longer an oxymoron-a phenomenon the
importance of which Professor Mae Kuykendall has cogently argued.1
59
Normatively, marriage itself changed once there was a tangible human
face for gay marriage. By January 2008, there were more than 10,000 lesbian
and gay couples who were legally married in the United States-and the total
was more than 80,000 if one included couples joined in civil unions, reciprocal
beneficiaries, or statewide domestic partnership.' 60 The existence of married (or
officially partnered) lesbian and gay spouses lends critical support for
persuading mainstream America that the State should recognize lesbian and gay
marriages. This is partly because it is easier to deny rights in the abstract than
to specific real-life couples. Perhaps more important, many skeptics probably
believed that gay marriage was just an equality stunt and an exercise in political
correctness. However, the existence of thousands of spouses who are clearly
serious about their relationships has made it clear to many Americans that gay
155. Even courts that have struck down state bars to lesbian and gay marriages had, before
the California Marriage Cases, either explicitly rejected the right to marry argument, see Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting strict scrutiny based upon a fundamental fight to marry
but insisting on strict scrutiny because of the state's sex-based classification), or set aside that
argument. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that the
state exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from marriage lacked a rational basis and therefore did
not require an analysis of the strict scrutiny arguments).
156. In fact, of course, most lesbian and gay adults did enjoy committed relationships, and
many were raising children. The gay community's self-identification had already changed
somewhat by 2000, but the perception by mainstream America changed more slowly.
157. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human
Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 853-54 (2008) (documenting the
recognition of same-sex marriages in the listed countries).
158. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
159. Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story About Language:
Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (1999).
160. See Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions
on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & Soc'v REV. 151, 169 tbl.4 (2009).
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marriage is a serious proposal that matters intensely to many LGBT persons.
Americans thought differently about the issue in 2008 than they did in 2000.
Some who found the notion of gay marriage inconceivable in 2000 found it
merely wrongheaded in 2008; many who earlier believed gay "marriage"
deeply misguided were no longer so sure; and many who were uncertain at the
turn of the millennium were staunch supporters eight years later.
161
A second post-2000 development was the general political acceptance of
same-sex marriage in those jurisdictions that adopted it. Three jurisdictions that
had recognized same-sex marriages did so in response to judicial insistence:
Massachusetts, 162 Canada, 163 and South Africa. 164 Academics as well as
practical politicians warned that judicial imposition of same-sex marriage
would lead to a backlash165-yet these three jurisdictions dramatically falsified
those predictions. In Massachusetts, an effort to override the court through a
constitutional amendment was ultimately routed by a 4-1 margin in the legis-
lature after voters reelected supporters of same-sex marriage and defeated a few
opponents in elections held between 2004 and 2008.166 In Canada, Parliament
responded to provincial court decisions rejecting legislation discriminating
against lesbian gay couples by adopting nationwide marriage legislation includ-
ing same-sex couples. 167 Critics of that legislation were defeated in the next
election; although conservatives won a subsequent election, their inclination to
repeal the law has apparently faded. 168 In South Africa, parliament immediately
161. See id. at 167 tbls. 2 & 3 (reporting steadily rising numbers of Americans who
supported same-sex marriage or civil unions from 2000 to 2008).
162. The Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated the statutory bar to same-sex marriage
(by the same 4-3 majority as California). See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. In 2004, the
legislature voted for a constitutional amendment recognizing civil unions but preserving marriage
for different-sex couples. The 2004 election was a triumph for supporters of same-sex marriage,
and in 2005 the legislature voted against the constitutional amendment by a vote of 157 to 39.
Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004,
at A14.
163. After the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the state was required to afford the same
legal rights and duties to same-sex couples as to different-sex couples in M. v. H., (1999) 2 S.C.R.
3, provincial courts in Ontario, Quebec, and Vancouver ruled same-sex marriage exclusions to be
violations of the Canadian Charter. See Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the Charter:
The Achievement of Formal Legal Equality (1985-2oo5) and Its Limits, 49 McGILL L.J. 1143
(2004).
164. In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006(3) BCLR 355 (CC), 2005 SACLR LEXIS
34, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled that the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples
from marriage violated the constitution's equality guarantee. (The Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa specifically lists sexual orientation as a suspect classification.)
165. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L.
REV. 431 (2005).
166. See Belluck, supra note 162 (2004 elections turned out several opponents of same-sex
marriage and returned all supporters).
167. Although it could have invoked its override power under the Charter's
"Notwithstanding Clause," Parliament in 2005 responded by legislatively extending marriage to
include same-sex couples. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C. ch. 33 (Can.).
168. Wintemute, supra note 163, at 1172 (antigay party defeated in the first post-marriage
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codified the Supreme Court's holding into positive law.
169
The experience in Massachusetts, Canada, and South Africa suggests that
opposition to same-sex marriage was less significant than commonly thought,
at least in some jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, constitutional deci-
sions not only reversed the burden of inertia, but also upended the endowment
effect: before the decisions, most people were unwilling to grant new marriage
rights to lesbian and gay couples, but after the decisions most people were
unwilling to revoke marriage rights that lesbian and gay couples were then
enjoying. Despite the 2000 Knight Initiative, opposition to same-sex marriage
seemed similarly soft in California, at least until Proposition 8. The state
legislature passed a same-sex marriage bill in 2005 that was vetoed by
Governor Schwarzenegger. In the 2006 elections, however, no supporter of
same-sex marriage lost her seat in the legislature. Likewise, the passage of the
bill again in 2007 saw no fallout on affirmative votes in the 2008 election.
This apparent change in popular opinion was interconnected with legal
developments. Table 1 below demonstrates that each of these jurisdictions
moved in a predictable step-by-step process, slowly recognizing rights for gay
people: (1) sodomy reform, resulting in homosexuals no longer being per se
outlaws; (2) antidiscrimination protections, especially for workplaces that
encouraged more LGBT persons to come out of the closet; and (3) recognition
of lesbian and gay unions and families, which revealed a new identity for "out"
gay people as parents and spouses. Once a jurisdiction had gone through each
of these steps, it was possible for the judiciary to reverse the burden of inertia
on the marriage issue as well as to influence the segment of public opinion that
was more open-minded on the issue. As the California Supreme Court justices
surely realized in 2008, their state had gone through exactly the same step-by-
step process as Massachusetts, Canada, and South Africa. Under the equality
practice paradigm, that meant that citizens would be more open to changing
their views if the court were to reverse the normative endowment effect on the
issue of same-sex marriage.
election; 57 percent of Canadians supportive of same-sex marriage).
169. Civil Union Act 2006, art. 17 (2006).
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Table 1: Equality Practice in Canada, Massachusetts, and California
Rights forg Peo Canada Massachusetts CaliforniaGay People
Sodomy Repeal 1969 1974 (court) 1975
2002 (court)
1992 (lower
Antidiscrimination court) 1989 1979 (court)
Law 1996 1992
1998 (court)
Hate Crime Law 1985 1996 1991




Second-Parent 1991-2001 1993 (court) courts)
Adoption (lower courts) 2001
2003 (court)
Same-Sex 2003 (lower
courts) 2004 (court) 2008 (court)
Marriage 2005
A third, and more speculative, change had taken root well before 2000 but
was, in my opinion, more pronounced by 2008: the identity of straight people
was evolving. In the 1970s, when gay marriage first emerged as a public issue
in California, it is likely that straight people viewed marriage as a fundamental
institution, strongly associated with procreation and child-rearing. Most
people's identity, especially their religious identity, was intimately tied to the
notion that they were married (or expected to be married) to someone of the
opposite sex, had procreated (or expected to do so), and were raising their
procreated children within the marriage. This classic family pattern has steadily
eroded in the last generation: the nuclear family is no longer dominant, and
many straight persons do not expect to marry even after having children.'
70
Many straight persons have children through artificial means or adoption.
Increasingly in America, with California leading the way, procreation has been
170. On the demographics of the current American households, with record numbers
headed by unmarried persons, see TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, MARRIED COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 (2003).
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divorced from marriage. By 2008, it appeared that an unprecedented number of
straight people did not see their fundamental identity tied to the old notion of
"one man, one woman, procreated-children" marriage. 171
These three changes meant that a cautious California Supreme Court,
trying to avoid raising the stakes of the culture wars, had the political discretion
to recognize same-sex marriage in 2008. However, the foregoing did not dictate
that the court would rule as it did. With a similarly receptive political climate,
the New York Court of Appeals in 2005 ruled against marriage claimants.
172
One vote prevented California from following the New York court's approach,
and that vote was Chief Justice Ronald George, a moderately conservative
Republican appointee to the court. There are many reasons why a conservative
ought to support gay marriage (fairness to LGBT people, support for gay
marriage from big business, and the pro-commitment features of marriage), but
the key reason for the chief justice was probably institutional and perhaps even
personal. Perez, a persuasive precedent, supplied a strong rule-of-law rationale
to sustain the lesbian and gay couples' constitutional challenge. Moreover,
extending Perez to same-sex marriage would reinforce the California Supreme
Court's reputation as the nation's cutting edge court, a constitutional leader
rivaling or, for gay rights, superseding the U.S. Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Ronald George would go down in the law books as a worthy successor to Chief
Justice Roger Traynor, the visionary jurist who wrote the plurality opinion in
Perez.
B. Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Classification: A Pluralist Inversion of
Representation-Reinforcement Theory
The attorney general's defense in the Marriage Cases looked a lot like the
State's defense in Perez more than half a century earlier. In both appeals, the
State claimed that the California Supreme Court should defer to the legislature
on a matter of social policy that had long been settled;' 73 that the court should
respect the definition of marriage as it had traditionally been understood by the
community;17 4 and that the proper remedy was with the legislature. 175 Cogni-
zant of this unfortunate parallel, the attorney general (former governor Jerry
171. Increasing numbers of openly straight Americans, including academics, have
intervened in the gay marriage debate to argue for propounding a new state institution to replace
civil marriage as the repository of rights and duties for couples. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Equal
Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (2008).
172. Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
173. Compare Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 35, 37-38, 41-43 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J.,
dissenting) (espousing the State's arguments), with Answer Brief of State of California and the
Attorney General to Opening Briefs on the Merits at 43-47, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008) (Case No. S 1479990) [hereinafter Attorney General's Answer Brief (Marriage)].
174. Compare Perez, 198 P.2d at 37 (Shenk, J., dissenting), with Attorney General's
Answer Brief (Marriage), supra note 173, at 45-46.
175. Compare Perez, 198 P.2d at 45-46 (Shenk, J., dissenting), with Attorney General's
Answer Brief (Marriage), supra note 173, at 48-54.
[Vol. 97:17851816
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1816 2009
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
Brown) argued in the Marriage Cases that Perez was materially different
because it involved a race-based classification that triggered strict scrutiny.
171
The challengers responded that excluding lesbian and gay couples from mar-
riage was discrimination based on sexual orientation, sexual orientation ought
to be considered a "suspect" classification for the same reasons as race, and the
marriage exclusion for same-sex couples should fail under strict scrutiny for the
same reasons the exclusion for different-race couples fell in Perez.
177
As a matter of following precedent, it was not hard for the court to rule
that sexual orientation is a suspect classification. The long-established,
precedent-based approach in California is that a classification (like race or sex)
is "suspect" if it (1) is an "immutable" trait that (2) has "no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society" and (3) has traditionally been the basis for
policies that reflect "inferiority and second-class citizenship" of stigmatized
groups. 178 For sexual orientation, the second and third criteria are hard to
dispute, especially in light of the history of antigay regulations and their
arbitrary and harsh enforcement. As Part I of this Foreword demonstrates,
California law was vigorously and increasingly antihomosexual for most of the
twentieth century, but what did the State have to show for its expense? It is not
clear that antihomosexual policies yielded any public benefits, beyond the
satisfaction that prejudiced citizens had in the knowledge that so-called
"queers" and "faggots" were announced enemies of the State and were occa-
sionally arrested, exposed, and both personally and professionally ruined. The
main tangible consequences of these policies were thousands of broken lives,
decent men and women who were outed or prosecuted by the State for
consensual romantic activities or overtures; thousands of bad marriages, where
closeted homosexuals entered into deluded matrimony with often-unsuspecting
heterosexuals of the opposite sex; and a tradition of police brutality and corrup-
tion in cities that were the main enforcers of antihomosexual rules.
In any event, the attorney general effectively conceded that stigmatizing
homosexuality has had no relationship to legitimate state policies and has
176. Attorney General's Answer Brief (Marriage), supra note 173, at 20-21.
177. Respondents' Opening Brief on the Merits, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal.
2008) (Case No. S1479990); see also id. at 39-50 (also arguing for strict scrutiny on the grounds
that the marriage exclusion is per se a sex discrimination claim and violates constitutional free
speech guarantees). There were several other petitioners, each making similar arguments. See,
e.g., Petitioner City and County of San Francisco's Opening Brief on the Merits, In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (Case No. S1479990) (arguing that the marriage exclusion of
same-sex couples was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis and failed to satisfy strict
scrutiny triggered by the sexual orientation classification and by infringements of the fundamental
rights to privacy and to marriage).
178. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539-41 (Cal. 1971). Other courts have
followed essentially these same criteria to find that sexual orientation is a suspect classification.
See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. 1998); M. v. H., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 2
(Can. Sup. Ct.), 63-74.
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traditionally been deployed to degrade a productive class of citizens. Nor did
the attorney general dispute that homosexuality is "immutable" for suspect
classification purposes.' 79 Sidestepping the question whether homosexuality is
hard-wired, the attorney general agreed that one's sexual orientation is not a
matter that the State can or should make an effort to change or influence.
Having conceded the three criteria announced and followed in Sail'er Inn, the
attorney general still argued that homosexuality should not be a suspect classi-
fication, because there was an implicit fourth criterion in the test, "political
powerlessness."' 80 The argument for this implicit fourth criterion was taken
from the representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review, classically
explained by former Stanford professor and dean John Hart Ely. Under Dean
Ely's theory, judges defer to the democratically accountable political process
unless the system is not working, either because in-groups are blocking
political change or because "discrete and insular minorities" are disabled from
effective participation because of "prejudice."' 181 Because gay people are now
an active group with influence in California politics, the attorney general
argued sexual orientation is not a classification that ought to galvanize special
judicial concern.
To accept the attorney general's argument, however, the California
Supreme Court would have had to reexamine or limit the reasoning of Sail'er
Inn (where the court had held that sex is a suspect classification). Women, the
group usually harmed by sex-based classifications, were not only politically
powerful in 1971, but they represented a majority of the electorate. According-
ly, Chief Justice George's majority opinion in the Marriage Cases rejected the
attorney general's proposed fourth criterion, but provided little explanation
beyond the power of precedent.' 82 The best explanation for rejecting a political
powerlessness criterion rests in the pluralist theory that is the theme of this
Foreword.
When a group is politically powerless, as blacks and gays were in the
early twentieth century and as women were in the nineteenth century, courts
179. Attorney General's Answer Brief (Marriage), supra note 173, at 24-25. The lower
court had reasoned that sexual orientation could not be a suspect classification because it was not
"immutable" in the way that race and sex are.
180. Id. at 25-38; see also id. at 39-54 (arguing that homosexuality might be considered
quasi-suspect, thereby triggering intermediate but not strict judicial scrutiny).
181. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); see also id. at 73-77, 87-103 (outlining the rationale for a representation-reinforcing
theory). The quotations in the text are from United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), which was the inspiration for Ely's theory.
182. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442-43 (Cal. 2008). There is a more detailed
explanation for why political powerlessness ought not be a requisite for heightened scrutiny of
sexual orientation classifications in Kerrigan v. Comm 'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008). Justice Palmer's opinion for the divided Connecticut Supreme Court posed the
powerlessness question this way: Is it fair to impose the burden of political inertia on LGBT
people? Id. at 444.
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have some political leeway to protect members' procedural liberties but would
be entering political risky terrain if they applied equal protection scrutiny with
any bite to discrimination against the marginalized, socially-stigmatized out-
group. One way of putting this is cognitive. Because the polity so thoroughly
assimilates the perspective of the dominant group, and because the voices of
the out-group are so thoroughly silenced, exclusionary or punitive treatment of
the out-group will not be considered "discrimination." Thus, Californians in the
1930s probably did not regard their sterilization law aimed at "inverts" to be
discriminatory, and a discrimination claim would have been laughed out of
court.183 Until very recently, few Americans believed that state marriage laws
"discriminated" against gay people, in part because they considered the one
man, one woman requirement of marriage to be natural, trans-historical, and
inevitable. 184 Indeed, this point of view remains widespread. In the Marriage
Cases, the dissenting justices made the remarkable claim that there was actually
no "discrimination" against lesbian and gay couples when the legislature and
the voters limited civil marriage to one man and one woman, because the gay
couple is not "similarly situated" to the straight couple.'
85
Another way of viewing the same point is through the lens of the political
process. When the out-group is truly marginalized, completely powerless, and
especially when it is both invisible and threatening, judicial review striking
down exclusionary measures is understood as promoting a group that counts for
nothing in the pluralist constellation, while disrespecting the views of either a
popular majority or a powerful minority. 186 If judges protected powerless
groups through judicial review, they would be subject to significant backlash,
and that is something even life-tenured federal judges avoid, presumably
because it undermines their legitimacy.' 87 State judges tend to be just as
183. Cf Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (sarcastically rejecting an
equal protection challenge to a state sterilization law as "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments").
184. For classic articulations, see, for example, John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of
Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019 (2001); C. Sydney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The
Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541 (1985).
185. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 464 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 785
(Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting). Indeed, Justice Baxter made the remarkable argument
that the marriage law does not even technically discriminate against gay people because the
lesbian is free to marry a man. Id. at 465; cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Texas's "Homosexual Conduct Law" does not discriminate based on
"homosexual" orientation, because it prohibits "homosexual conduct" by heterosexual people as
well as by homosexual people); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (rejecting Virginia's
argument that its antimiscegenation law does not discriminate against people of color, because its
bar applies to white people as well).
186. By holding that a despised group is "similar" to the majority for equal protection
purposes, even if in a small way, a judge opens up the judiciary to incalculable rage from the
majority, for the very point of discriminating against powerless minorities is to set them apart as
degraded, inferior, and wholly unlike the majority.
187. For demonstrations that the U.S. Supreme Court does not stray far from public
opinion, see NATHAN PERSILY ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY
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cautious, and when they are not they get into trouble. The best recent example
is the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, which ruled in 1993
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was sex discrimination
and subject to strict scrutiny.1 88 The court did not strike down the State's
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage; the case was remanded to the
trial court for a hearing where the State could produce evidence that the
exclusion was needed to serve a compelling public interest. The mere
possibility of same-sex marriage in Hawaii created a firestorm, fomenting an
effort that in 1998 led to a revision of the state constitution by ballot measure.
The success of the legal and political strategy against gay marriage in Hawaii, a
state of legendary pluralist and progressive electoral tendencies, immediately
triggered anti-gay-marriage statutes and referenda in most other states and, in
1996, the federal Defense of Marriage Act.
189
Thus, even if judges are themselves not captives of cognitive frames that
disable discrimination claims from marginal minorities, few judges would
ignore the overwhelmingly negative reaction of their audiences and invite
charges that they were promoting a despised group. In some jurisdictions,
especially those where there are very few openly gay persons, any liberalization
of the law-from sodomy reform to the adoption of antidiscrimination
measures to recognition of lesbian and gay unions-has called forth charges
that the reformers were "promoting" the supposedly repulsive and unhealthy
"homosexual lifestyle."
1 90
The judicial calculus changes once a minority emerges with enough cohe-
sion and political traction-voting strength, money, and allies-to become part
of the pluralist process. This occurred in 1970s California for LGBT persons.
Judges have incentives to recognize claims by politically relevant groups for
the idealistic reason of integrating the now-emergent minority into the state's
politics and law and also for the selfish reason that today's emergent minority
might be part of tomorrow's mainstream. Almost any judge would prefer to be
remembered as Roger Traynor, who wrote the plurality opinion in Perez, rather
than John W. Shenk, who wrote a shrill dissenting opinion that many today
would view as racist.
(2008); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Opinions, 87 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 87
(1993).
188. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion).
189. The tremendous backlash to Baehr is described in GERALD ROSENBERG, HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 362-63 (rev. ed. 2008); David Orgon
Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and Fate, 22 HAW. L. REV.
19(2000).
190. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 NYU L. REV. 1327 (2000)
[hereinafter Eskridge, No Promo Homo].
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Mark this irony: The Marriage Cases illustrate how Ely's theory gets it
exactly backwards. 9 1 A despised and truly powerless minority can hope for a
few liberty-protecting and process rights, but not equal protection review with
any bite from American judges. Only when the minority emerges from true
powerlessness and is able to gain allies in the pluralist process can it hope for
equality review with bite. Strict scrutiny becomes available only after judges
are persuaded that the minority is finally part of the political mainstream.
C. The Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights:
Straight Logic or Legal Transvestism?
In Perez, the State argued that laws prohibiting different-race marriages
were not discriminatory because they treated people of color and whites the
same. The California Supreme Court rejected that analysis, holding that equal
protection safeguards the rights of individuals, and an individual has a
presumptive right not to be judged based upon the irrelevant criterion of her
race or the race of her partner. 192 For example, if the State refuses to allow Joe,
an African American, to marry Jane, a Caucasian American, it is race discrimi-
nation because the regulatory variable (the criterion that produces the legal
discrimination) is Joe's race; if Joe were Caucasian, the marriage would be
permitted. By analogy, if the State refuses to allow Joe to marry Carlos, it is sex
discrimination, because the regulatory variable is Joe's sex; if Joe were a
woman, the marriage would be permitted. After Sail'er Inn, sex, like race, is a
suspect classification in California. As a matter of pure legal logic, therefore,
California's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is sex discrimination,
subject to strict scrutiny whether or not sexual orientation is a suspect classifi-
cation.
193
While Chief Justice George's opinion in the Marriage Cases was pioneer-
ing in its endorsement of both the right of same-sex couples to marry and
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, it followed other state and federal
courts in rejecting the sex discrimination argument for gay marriage. But the
court's stated reasons for rejecting the argument are fairly weak. To begin with,
the court suggested that because the marriage exclusion treats both sexes
"equally" (a woman cannot marry a woman, and a man cannot marry a man),
the law did not amount to sex discrimination "as commonly understood." 194 Yet
this is precisely the argument that Perez (and later Loving) rejected in the race
context.
195
191. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 4, 42-56 (1994).
192. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Cal. 1948).
193. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 NYU L. REV. 197 (1994).
194. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436 (Cal. 2008).
195. Perez, 198 P.2d at 19-20 (rejecting the state's argument that the antimiscegenation
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The court distinguished Perez and Loving on the ground that the race
classification in those cases matched up with the racist ideology of white196
supremacy. Yet California's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage
was explicitly motivated by a sexist ideology. The Bill Digest for the 1977
statutory amendment that explicitly excluded same-sex couples from marriage
said that the "special benefits" of marriage were
designed to meet situations where one spouse, typically the female,
could not adequately provide for herself because she was engaged in
raising children .... Why extend the same windfall to homosexual
couples except in those rare situations (perhaps not so rare among
females) where they function as parents with at least one of the
partners devoting a significant period of his or her life to staying home
and raising children?19 7
The Bill Digest shows how the 1977 same-sex marriage bar sought to entrench
gender roles, the core justification for the court's sex discrimination juris-
prudence. The legislature intended to reinforce the idea of family as necessarily
involving role specialization where the female bears and raises children and the
male works outside the home. This, like white supremacy, is an example of
"outmoded" stereotyping. 98
The 1977 Bill Digest also suggests a deeper way in which the legislature
was trying to entrench rigid gender roles. Disallowing same-sex marriage
confirms the notion that a woman's only possibility of a meaningful romance
and lifetime commitment is through marriage to a man, and vice-versa. This
notion is our culture's meta-narrative for gender stereotyping. Its foundational
idea is complementarity: woman is the "opposite sex" from man (always the
measure); man and woman are yin and yang, different in ways that generate
and define romantic, committed love that can result in both marriage and,
inevitably, children. That a woman can fall in love with, form a lifetime
commitment to, and raise children with another woman, and not her
"complement" (a man), is a deep challenge to this gender stereotype-and
indeed to all gender stereotypes. 199 The California Supreme Court had itself
remarked that, as long as the law "differentiate[s] sharply, in treatment or in
words, between men and women on the basis of irrelevant and artificially
law did not discriminate because of race, as white persons were treated the same as persons of
color).
196. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437-38; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (white supremacy as stated reason for the Virginia antimiscegenation law).
197. Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Bill Digest, A.B. 607, 1977-1978 Reg. Sess.,
discussed in Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 440 n.58.
198. Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 53 P.2d 849, 854-55 (1977).
199. There is a substantial feminist literature on the close relationship between sexism and
homophobia. See, e.g., SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988); Claudia
Card, Why Homophobia?, 5 HYPATIA 110 (1990); ADRIENNE RICH, COMPULSORY
HETEROSEXUALITY AND LESBIAN EXISTENCE (1981). See generally Koppelman, supra note 193,
at 234-57 (collecting and discussing the extensive literature).
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created distinctions, the likelihood of men and women coming to regard one
another primarily as fellow human beings and only secondarily as
representatives of another sex will continue to be remote., 200 If Perez required
strict scrutiny because the State denied (important) marriage rights through a
(suspect) race-based classification seeking to entrench a (disapproved) racist
ideology, then the Marriage Cases required strict scrutiny because the State
denied (important) marriage rights through a (suspect) sex-based classification
seeking to entrench a (disapproved) sexist ideology of rigid gender roles.
Chief Justice George's last response sounds like his worst but, under the
theory of this Foreword, is actually his best. His opinion points out that previ-
ous cases, starting with Gay Law Students in 1979, have treated discrimination
against persons attracted to others of their own sex as "sexual orientation"
discrimination, distinct from "sex" discrimination.20 1 The most genuine claim,
the one that primarily motivated the parties in the Marriage Cases, was the
sexual orientation claim, not the sex discrimination claim. The chief justice
believed that the sex discrimination argument is a form of constitutional trans-
202vestism: it dresses up a gay rights argument in feminist garb. It would be a
"category" mistake for judges to accept such a secondary reason for strict
scrutiny. But why is it not possible for a person to suffer discrimination for
more than one reason? This is a common claim in the literature on intersec-
tionality: discrimination against black women, for example, can be synergistic,
a complicated product of both race and sex discrimination.203 Perhaps a closer
fit is the following: If an employer discriminates against a Jewish employee, is
it discrimination because of "ethnicity" or is it discrimination because of
"religion"? Often it is both, and the two forms of animus are so intertwined that
it is sometimes impossible to separate them. So, too, it often is with
discrimination against lesbians. In military witch hunts persecuting suspected
lesbians, the motivation has traditionally been more sexist than homophobic:
according to experts who have served in the armed forces and studied the issue,
women have been discharged at higher rates than men for homosexuality, in
large part because sexist soldiers and commanders resented the woman's
departure from traditional gender roles (including the role of being available for
dating and sex to male service personnel). 204 As I have argued elsewhere,animus against lesbians is different than animus against gay men. Antigay male
200. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 201 (Cal. 1985) (quoting LEO KANOWITZ,
WOMEN AND THE LAW 4 (1969)).
201. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437-39 (Cal. 2008).
202. This argument originated with Edward Stein. See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex
Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001); see also
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 223-28 (advancing but casting some doubt on this
argument).
203. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
204. See Michelle Benecke & Kristin Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Fields:
Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 215 (1990).
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prejudice is more strongly based on fears of predatory sexuality and less on
gender role than antilesbian prejudice. 20 5 At the very least, the chief justice's
view that sexual orientation and sex discrimination must be legally separate is a
debatable proposition, and it is wrong in the case of antilesbian discrimination.
Indeed, a mystery of the Marriage Cases is why the chief justice went out
of his way to address the sex discrimination argument at all. Because his
opinion announced two separate bases for strict scrutiny, rejection of sex
discrimination as a third basis was dictum, and the analytical problems with the
chief justice's discussion might cause unnecessary trouble for his entire
effort.206 The pluralist theory advanced in this Foreword is a possible justifica-
tion for the chief justice's analysis. I should like to read his opinion as an
invitation for Californians to acknowledge the irrationality of antihomosexual
policies and to embrace gay groups into the pluralist political process. Like-
wise, the opinion is an overture to LGBT Californians to consider themselves
full and equal citizens, a status that progressive California leaders ranging from
Willie Brown to Kenneth Karst have long advanced.20 7 The chief justice
underscored these messages doctrinally as well as rhetorically by (1) removing
the last formal state discrimination against LGBT Californians (until
Proposition 8 was passed), (2) announcing that sexual orientation is a suspect
classification like race and sex, and (3) abjuring the possibility that LGBT
people were securing their place at the table on the backs of feminists. Gay
people have their own place at the table-and they earned it through their own
efforts. Will they be able to keep it?
III
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: CAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
State constitutions are by design more malleable than the U.S. Constitu-
tion. This may be a virtue, because they provide a means for state constitutions
to codify America's evolving public values. For example, the California
Constitution creates three mechanisms for formal constitutional change: (1) the
amendment process, which allows the people to alter the constitution
expeditiously by simple majority vote; 208 (2) the revision process, whichrequires both legislative and popular involvement to make more fundamental
205. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 227-28.
206. The most appreciative audience for the chief justice's opinion is gay people and their
allies. Many gays (men as well as women) are themselves strong feminists, and non-gay feminists
are gay people's most powerful allies, as are leading race theorists such as Professor Crenshaw.
The chief justice's simplistic argumentation rejecting the sex discrimination argument might be
expected to draw sharp reactions from lesbian and other feminists, from feminist gay men such as
myself, and from race and other critical theorists.
207. See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: FEDERAL EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
208. CAL. CONST., art. XVIII, § 3.
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constitutional changes; 20 9 and (3) a constitutional convention called by the
legislature, which could create a whole new document.
210
When the California Supreme Court decided the Marriage Cases, the
justices were aware that their ruling would almost certainly be revisited by the
initiative process. That awareness made it somewhat easier for the chief justice
to write the sweeping opinion he issued, because it would only reverse the
burden of inertia and would not end the public debate about same-sex marriage
in California. As expected, that debate occurred in the 2008 general election
cycle. A majority of California voters approved Proposition 8, which added a
new Section 7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution: "Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. 211
The issues of constitutionalism and equality practice raised by Proposition
8 are the most interesting ones yet posed by the nationwide campaign for same-
sex marriage. Proposition 8 provides a lens for examining the evolving rhetoric
accompanying antigay initiatives in California and elsewhere in the last
generation; the ways in which constitutional amendments can yet be
unconstitutional; and the responsibility of the judiciary to police such constitu-
tional infractions.
A. Background to Proposition 8: The Modernization and Sedimentation of
Antigay Rhetoric in the Initiative Process
As philosopher Elizabeth Young-Bruehl has theorized, antihomosexual
prejudice has roots in three different psychological needs of the bigoted
person.2 12 Hysterical homophobes are troubled by their own "dirty" sexual
desires and need to displace those unacceptable feelings onto other persons,
traditionally people of color and, more recently, gay people. Obsessional
homophobes deal with their own personal and professional failures or disap-
pointments by displacing blame onto another minority, such as Jews (whose
"greed" causes the poverty of the jealous bigot) and "homosexuals" (who
"recruit" children and therefore attack and undermine the bigot's family).
Narcissist homophobes handle an unstable or uncertain identity by contrasting
themselves against a degraded "other"; men assert their masculinity by
contrasting themselves with women and "homosexuals." Whatever his or her
precise motivations, the homophobe not only bears little resemblance to the
drooling bigot romanticized by the civil rights movement, but in fact is a func-
tional person partly because of his or her bigotry.
For most of the twentieth century, with its peak during Governor Earl
Warren's tenure (1943-53), California and its local governments saturated
209. Id. art. XVIII, § 2.
210. Id. art. XVIII, § 1.
211. Id. art. I, § 7.5 (new constitutional language added by Proposition 8).
212. ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 32-37, 157-58 (1996).
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public culture with policies and messages endorsing and reinforcing all of these
antihomosexual prejudices. As recounted above, the State sexualized homo-
sexuals as "degenerate" "moral perverts" (the precise language used in the state
code), mentally as well as morally defective, and just one stage up from
animals. Homosexuals were reflexively grouped with child molesters; the most
draconian antihomosexual legislation, such as the sexual psychopath statutes,
were billed as responses to child molestation by older men against girls but
were written broadly enough to include homosexual men having consensual sex
with other men.213 By demonizing homosexuals, Earl Warren's California
deluded itself into believing it was purifying public culture, protecting children,
and reaffirming family values. Not surprisingly, the first statewide
antihomosexual initiative, Proposition 6, brought to the voters by Senator John
214Briggs in 1978, openly invoked these traditional prejudices.
Following the successful strategy of Anita Bryant's "Save Our Children"
campaign persuading voters to override Dade County, Florida's
antidiscrimination ordinance in 1977, Senator Briggs (who participated in
Bryant's effort) ran a campaign that demonized "homosexuals" to a far greater
degree than Governor Warren had. Its primary theme was that "homosexuals"
are child molesters, and homosexual teachers will molest children. The cam-
paign's prime handout was a collection of fifteen lurid newspaper clips, ranging
from "Teacher Accused of Sex Acts with Boy Students" to "Why a 13-year-old
Is Selling His Body., 215 In one speech, Briggs reportedly associated
"homosexuals" with adulterers, burglars, communists, murderers, rapists, child
pornographers, effeminate courtesans, and Richard Nixon.2 16 The message:
"homosexuals" are enemies of the people, sociopaths who cannot be trusted
around children. Aside from the fact that the Yes-on-Six campaign ignored
lesbians, who have the lowest rate of child molestation, it ignored evidence that
gay men are no more likely to assault minors than straight or bisexual men.
217
Pursuing the "Save Our Children" theme that Anita Bryant had pioneered,
Senator Briggs explained that homosexuality was not only predatory, but
predatory in a way worse than molestation: "homosexuals" sought conversion
of innocent children to dirty homosexuality. In a public debate with openly gay
city official Harvey Milk, Briggs put it this way: "They don't have any children
of their own. If they don't recruit children or very young people, they'll all die
away.... That's why they want to be teachers and be equal status and have
213. See 1945 Cal. Stat. 623 § 5500 (amending the state sexual psychopath law, originally
justified as a protection for children, to include sodomy between consenting adults as well).
214. 1978 Cal. Ballot, Prop. 6 (proposing to bar persons who advocate or practice
homosexual relations from teaching in the state's public schools) (discussed in Hunter, supra note
96).
215. SHILTS, supra note 112, at 239 (quotations in text).
216. Id.
217. Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94
PEDIATRIcs 41 (1994) (answering the question posed by the title, "not particularly").
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those people serve as role models and encourage people to join them."
218
Elsewhere, Briggs emphasized the conspiratorial nature of homosexuality: "If
you let one homosexual teacher stay, soon there'll be two, then four, then 8,
then 25-and before long, the entire school will be taught by homosexuals."
219
Because Briggs was widely disliked and his message was extreme, the
Yes-on-Six campaign increasingly fell back on outlandish arguments such as
those quoted above. But Briggs and his main supporters saw their campaign as
a positive and not a negative one. From their point of view, the campaign was
about traditional family values and the rights of parents, not about demeaning
homosexuals. For example, the last debate of the campaign was sponsored by
the "Pro-Family Coalition" in Orange County (represented in the legislature by
Briggs), but, as before, the actual arguments marshaled at the debate were
largely negative.
220
The Briggs Initiative lost by a wide margin, but most other
antihomosexual initiatives of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s won majorities with
toned-down versions of these antihomosexual tropes.221 One well-known
example was Colorado voters' adoption of Amendment 2 to their constitution
in 1992, barring the State from recognizing or enforcing any claim of discrimi-
nation because of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct," etc.
The arguments made by proponents of Amendment 2 were very similar to those
raised by supporters of the Briggs Initiative fourteen years earlier:
"homosexuals" are promiscuous and consumed by venereal disease (the
average lesbian lives only to about age forty-six, said the official explanation
for Amendment 2); they are also predatory, seeking to invade decent people's
houses and schools, take away their jobs, and recruit their children. As such,
the campaign argued that Coloradans could and should reaffirm traditional
family values by ending "special rights" given by some communities to
"homosexuals and lesbians. ' 222 Although not mentioning the ballot materials,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans nonetheless reasoned that
Amendment 2 was so broadly written that it lacked a connection to any state
218. SHILTS, supra note 112, at 230 (quoting Briggs in one of his several debates with
Milk). For a video presentation of one of the debates, see THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (Black
Sand Productions 1984).
219. SHILTS, supra note 112, at 239 (quoting Briggs).
220. Id. at 248.
221. See Barbra Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245
(1998) (documenting the rising tide of antigay initiatives and their unprecedented success rate,
1959-1993); Donald Haider-Markel et al., Win, Lose, or Draw: A Re-Examination of Direct
Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304-14 (2007) (documenting that 71 percent of
antigay ballot initiatives prevailed in the period 1972-2005). For important normative context of
antigay initiatives, see Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994).
222. The Amendment 2 ballot materials are reprinted in Robert Nagel, Playing Defense, 6
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 167, 191-99 (1997). They are discussed in light of Young-Bruehl's
theory of prejudices. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 210-11.
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policy except "animus" against gay people, which was unacceptable.22 3
Romer was a landmark in America's pluralist Constitution. It announced,
in effect, that gay people could not be treated as despised outlaws and that
public policy had to reflect something more than antigay prejudice. 224 Romer's
holding reflected the nation's normative movement (with California as a leader)
away from viewing homosexuality as an inherently malignant variation and
toward viewing it as a tolerable but inferior variation from normal hetero-
sexuality. 5 Responding to the same normative movement, and probably also
to Romer, sponsors of antigay initiatives radically altered their rhetoric, mod-
ernizing their arguments to move away from open denigration of gay people
and toward larger civic republican values or overall social utility.226 Yet the
modernized arguments had a sedimented quality: underneath them were
traditional antihomosexual tropes, especially the notion that homosexuals are
selfish, antifamily, and intent on recruiting innocent children.
227
The same year Romer was handed down, Congress passed and President
Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),22 8 the most
sweeping antigay federal statute in American history. This federal law assured
states that they would not have to recognize gay marriages entered into
elsewhere229 and hard-wired into federal statutory and regulatory law the notion
that "marriage" and "spouse" would only be recognized in the context of one
man, one woman relationships.
2 30
As the title suggests, DOMA, like Proposition 6, was not billed as an
attack on gay people. Instead, its message was positive-to protect marriage
against further dilution and to ensure that the nation's children would be raised
in healthy family environments. Representative Canaday, a DOMA sponsor,
asked: "Should the Congress tell the children of America that it is a matter of
indifference whether they establish families with a partner of the opposite sex
or cohabit with someone of the same sex? 2 31 Although Canaday and other
223. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 as inconsistent
with the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment's extreme breadth swept well beyond its
asserted rational bases and suggested that it was grounded in antigay animus, a conclusion that
was amply supported by the ballot materials referenced in text but not cited by the Court).
224. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMM. 257
(1996).
225. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 19, at 209-18.
226. On the modernization of justification for practices harming women or minorities, see
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2120 (1996); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating
Wives'Rights to Earnings, t86o-193o, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994).
227. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 190.
228. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
229. Id. § 2, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
230. Id. § 3, codified at I U.S.C. § 7.
231. 142 CoNG. REC. H16,976 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canaday)
(arguing for DOMA); see id. at H 17,079 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canaday),
(assertively uttering exactly the same words the next day).
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sponsors acknowledged that DOMA represented a "moral disapproval of
homosexuality," they emphasized that theirs was a tolerant approach,
emphasizing instead their "moral conviction that heterosexuality better
comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality." 232 In addition
to the focus on protecting children against the allure of "morally disapproved"
homosexuality, the sponsors of DOMA often revealed their underlying
worldview. For example, Representative Robert Barr, the lead House sponsor,
proclaimed that the country needed to reaffirm family values because the
"flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames of self-centered
morality are licking at the very foundation of our society: the family unit."
233
By the turn of the millennium, thirty states had adopted statutes or
constitutional provisions explicitly barring judicial recognition of same-sex
marriages. Introducing Proposition 22 for a vote in March 2000, Senator Pete
Knight proposed to make California the thirty-first. Although the media
suggested that Senator Knight was acting out his own antigay anxieties,
234
Knight's public pronouncements followed the DOMA script. His negative
message was that homosexuals are not normal and that their agenda involved
the "trash[ing]" of marriage. 235 But Knight put much greater emphasis on his
positive message: "We must affirm the importance of Mom and Dad in our
children's lives. 236
The defense-of-marriage argument employed by Canaday and Knight had
the virtues of (1) emphasizing traditionalists' positive case and engaging in less
demonization of gay people, (2) linking their positive theory of the family to a
larger traditionalist understanding of the State's responsibility for a productive
definition of the family, and (3) advancing the pluralist enterprise in
affirmatively conceding the decency of gay people and some rights. As a
dramatic example, in 2004, Senator Knight said that he had no problem with
the statewide domestic partnership law for lesbian and gay couples, even after
the legislature had (in 2003) expanded the benefits and duties of that institution
to come close to those afforded civil marriage.
237
232. H.R Rep. No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905; accord 142
CONG. REC. S22,451 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coates) (asserting that
"traditional marriage and family in our law is not intolerance" and that "[t]olerance does not
require us to say that all lifestyles are morally equal").
233. 142 CONG. REC. H17,070 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
234. The media repeatedly stressed that one of Senator Knight's sons was openly gay and
that his son's coming out had created considerable tension with the father. E.g., Jennifer Warren,
"State Sen. Knight Laments Son's Commentary," L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at A3.
235. Interview with W.J. Pete Knight by Leon Worden (Apr. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/newsmaker/sg042504.htm [hereinafter 2004 Knight
Interview] ("It's the institution of marriage that is being deliberately trashed by gay activists
seeking same-sex marriage.").
236. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, NONPARTISAN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 22
(2000), available at http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc.files/mar00/id/prop22.html.
237. 2004 Knight Interview, supra note 235.
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An important limitation of the defense-of-marriage argument was that it
did not rest on any evidence. Further, it was inconsistent with evidence from
countries (like Denmark) that legally recognized lesbian and gay partnerships
and then saw marriage among straight people make a rebound238 and subse-
quent evidence from Canada and Massachusetts, where legalized gay marriage
had no discernible effect on the institution of marriage. The defense-of-
marriage argument was, from the beginning, a lavender herring, and by 2008
this paucity of evidence rendered it an embarrassment to some traditionalists.
The limitations of the demonization-of-gays and the defense-of-marriage
arguments did not mean that traditionalists were unable to advance arguments
to support Proposition 8. In light of Romer, traditional-family-values strategists
avoided demonizing gay people but still managed to express their skepticism
regarding gay marriage. For example, the home page of the Protect Marriage
website offered a gay-tolerant but marriage-skeptical pop-up cartoon.239 The
cartoon depicted a happy suburban family: Tom the dad, Jan the mom, two
kids, and a dog. Tom mows the lawn, Jan likes to cook, and the whole family
loves their minivan-and their neighbors, a male couple (Dan and Michael).
The gays kept the family's pet dog when they went on vacation, and Jan
(observant of traditional gender roles) brought Dan soup when he was sick.
Dramatic tension comes to the cartoon when Proposition 8 is placed on the
election ballot, and the family has to decide: Should we take away the matri-
monial rights of our nice neighbors?
The dramatic tension eases when Jan and Tom do some research on the
Internet and discover that their little gay buddies have all the rights and
benefits of marriage, through the domestic partnership statute. Why do Dan and
Michael have to have "marriage" when they already have all these rights?
Then, Jan learns from her sister Nancy that when Massachusetts recognized
same-sex marriage, one school forced children to learn that gay marriage was
as good as traditional marriage; even though parents objected, the courts ruled
that the school could do this without even notifying the parents. Jan and Tom
then grew concerned that changing the definition of marriage would open a
Pandora's Box: Would the public school system teach their children that gay
marriage is just as good as traditional marriage? What message would we send
the children? Would their church be required to perform same-sex marriages,
238. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER
OR FOR WORSE? (2006) (comprehensive survey of Scandinavian registered partnership laws and
practices). Although traditionalists claimed that Denmark's 1989 law had meant the "end of
marriage" in that society, the evidence demonstrated that in the seventeen years after lesbian and
gay unions were given almost all the legal duties and rights of marriage, the marriage rate had
gone up (after decades of pre-1989 yearly declines) and the divorce rate had gone down (after
decades of yearly increases). See id. at 173-75. The nonmarital childbirth rate had stabilized (after
going up fourfold from 1971 to 1989). See id. at 190-92.
239. The pop-up cartoon is the portal through which the viewer enters www.Protect
Marriage.com, the website for the Yes-on-Eight groups.
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contrary to its teachings? The decision becomes easier and easier, the more
Tom and Jan research and deliberate. They decide to support Proposition 8-
and then invite the gay guys over for a barbecue. In the end, everyone seems
happy in this very American story: Jan and Tom have made a responsible
decision; the kids are delighted that they are being sent a good message and
served tasty burgers; Michael and Dan live happily, and childlessly, ever after.
It's like a trip through Wisteria Lane.
The kinder, gentler advocates of Proposition 8 certainly saw themselves as
defending traditional marriage; they did not emphasize (though neither did they
abandon) the rapidly degenerating argument that gay marriage would mean the
end of marriage and the beginning of polygamy (etc.). Instead, the proponents
modernized and cleaned up Anita Bryant's argument that more rights for
homosexuals means fewer rights for parents and, especially, children. Thus, the
main argument for overturning the Marriage Cases was that the four majority
justices ("four Justices from San Francisco" according to the Tom-and-Jan pop-
up cartoon) were not only forcing gay marriage onto citizens and parents, but
were forcing it onto schoolchildren, even over parental objections.
Recall Jan's conversation with her sister, Nancy, who lives in Massachu-
setts. After that State recognized same-sex marriage, a schoolteacher read the
book King & King to her second-grade class; the book is a love story where a
young man-and not a maiden-is swooped up and married by a Prince
Charming. Children told their parents they had been taught that a boy could
marry another boy. When some parents objected, the courts ruled that the state
antidiscrimination law gave the schools this authority, and there was no legal
provision for parents to opt their children out of this instruction. 24 "It's all
about the schools" was one mantra of Protect Marriage. Indeed, its main argu-
ment for Proposition 8 was that the schools and the courts would force children
to read and internalize the pro-gay message of King & King.
Yet nothing in the Marriage Cases says what schools must or must not
teach. Do the Marriage Cases interact with existing law to impose a pro-gay
marriage instructional requirement? The proponents of Proposition 8 said they
did, based on the following logical chain.241 First, if a public school offers a
program in health education, it is supposed to provide some instruction about
"the legal . . . aspects and responsibilities of marriage." 242 Second, the
Education Code further provides that "[n]o teacher shall give instruction nor
shall a school district sponsor any activity that promotes a discriminatory bias
240. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
241. Memorandum of Real Parties in Interest Ron Prentice et al., in Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Mandate, Jenkins v. Bowen, Case No. 34-2008-00017366-CU-WM-GDS (Super. Ct.,
County of Sacramento, Aug. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Opposition Memorandum].
242. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51890(a)(1)(D), 51933(b)(7)(2004) (stating that if a school
district includes a program of sex and AIDS-prevention education, it is required to "teach respect
for marriage and committed relationships").
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because of a characteristic" protected by state law (including sexual orientation
as well as race, sex, etc.).243 Third, the California Supreme Court ruled that
traditional marriage must be viewed as discriminating against gay persons on
the basis of sexual orientation. Q.E.D., a school offering health instruction must
teach Jan and Tom's children about marriage, and that instruction must
emphasize that gay marriage is just as good as traditional marriage, lest the
school violate the antidiscrimination mandates.
244
There are several problems with the foregoing argument. First, and most
important, the Education Code does not require participating school districts to
say anything at all about gay marriage; exactly what schools teach about mar-
riage is a matter of their discretion, so long as it is neutral. Thus, a teacher can
tell the students that marriage is a serious commitment, though presumably he
or she cannot tell the students that man-woman marriage is a serious commit-
ment but woman-woman marriage is not. Second, the California Department of
Education has instructed school districts to "work with parents and community
members to decide how controversial issues such as homosexuality, abortion,
and masturbation will, or will not, be addressed. 2 45 Third, the Education Code
allows any parent "to remove his or her child from instruction that conflicts
with their religious beliefs. 246
Although the Proposition 8 proponents repeatedly invoked the experience
of one group of parents in Massachusetts, who were affected primarily by that
state's antidiscrimination law (and not its marriage law), California's allowance
of parental opt-outs suggests that the proponents were wrong to insist that
parents have no recourse were such instruction to be provided. It also did not
follow that the Marriage Cases required schools to endorse same-sex marriage
or even to equate it with different-sex marriage.
247
In short, the primary argument for Proposition 8 (the risk that California
would impose on second graders the view that gay marriage is the same as
traditional marriage) was at best overstated and, when held up to legal scrutiny,
243. Id. § 51500, as amended by 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 569 (S.B. 777), § 29.
244. Opposition Memorandum, Jenkins v. Bowen, supra note 241, at 12-17.
245. Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandate, Jenkins v. Bowen, supra note 241,
at 9.
246. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51240.
247. Under both the statute and the decision, schools could-and probably should-remain
entirely neutral about the marriage debate. This may be an underlying problem for the primary
boosters of Yes-on-Eight, namely traditionalist Mormons and Catholics. What the Marriage Cases
would question is a school policy affirmatively teaching students that there is "real marriage" for
straight couples and "phony marriage" or "second-class marriage" for homosexual couples. Such a
policy could violate the constitutional rule of the Marriage Cases, primarily because it would be a
discrimination based on sexual orientation and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. For religious
traditionalists who wanted to use the schools as instruments for inculcating traditional family
values (and mild denigration of lesbian and gay relationships), then their advertisement has more
than a kernel of truth. But the ad goes further, to argue that the Marriage Cases impose upon
schools an affirmative duty to endorse gay marriage and to equate it with what they consider
traditional marriage. That claim seems erroneous.
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flat wrong. Worse, the argument was a direct invocation of the aforementioned
"obsessional prejudice" against gay people: fears that greedy homosexuals
want to impose huge costs on society to satisfy their agenda and that they want
to recruit children-your children-for their chosen lifestyle. Because Prop 8
passed by a slender margin (52 percent to 48 percent), it is likely that this
obsessional, inaccurate argument made a difference in the outcome.
Table 2 below summarizes the evolution of traditionalist arguments for
antigay initiatives in California and elsewhere. On the one hand, it is remark-
able that, in less than a generation, the rhetoric has abandoned open appeals to
the most vicious antihomosexual prejudices. The rhetoric now emphasizes
policy consequences of gay marriage rather than demonization of gay people.
Indeed, it is very important that traditionalists of many different backgrounds
have agreed that gay people should be tolerated and, to a certain extent, accept-
ed as part of the body politic. This is very important for the Constitution of
pluralism. On the other hand, the kinder, gentler antigay initiatives, such as
Proposition 8, still make calculated appeals to obsessional and narcissistic
prejudices and stereotypes about gay people. In light of the State's longtime
demonization of gay people as selfish, predatory, antifamily, and prone to
recruitment of vulnerable children, the reasonable and amusing Tom-and-Jan
cartoon takes on a more ominous meaning, especially in light of its remarkable
and knowing distortions of California law.
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Table 2. Evolving Rhetoric of Antigay Initiatives
Representations The Aggressive How Society Ought to
of "Homosexual Define Itself, Opposed
"Homosexuals" Agenda" to Homosexuality
Strong Appeal to Strong Appeal to
1977-78 (Dade Hysterical Strong Appeal to Narcissistic Prejudice:
Prejudice: Obsessional Americans are pure,County; Briggs "Homosexuals" Prejudice: religious, chaste,
Initiative; are dirty,Predatory unselfish (in contrast to
later, Colorado dirty, "Homosexuals"Amendment 2) diseased, reri n oet impure, godless,
subhuman, recruit and molest promiscuous, selfish
polluted your children "homosexuals")
Mild Appeal toObsessional Strong Appeal toObeudicSlf Narcissistic Prejudice:Downplay Prejudice: Selfish Americans are morally
2000 (Knight Hysterical "Homosexuals"
and Other Appeals: "Homo- want to "trash straight, protect their
Marriage sexuals" are marriage" and children, and believe in
Initiatives) tolerable but imperil children procreative familyvalues (in contrast to
selfish misfits just to secure morally defective,
special rights for sterile "homosexuals")
themselves
Reject Hysterical Mild Appeal to Mild Appeal to
Appeals: Gay Obsessional Narcissistic Prejudice:
people are our Obessiona Americans believe in
nice, childless Prejudice: Pushy traditional marriage
2008 neighbors, and we Politically Correct with children, with
(Proposition 8) should be nice to Gays want to serious obligations andthem, but we force their agenda unitive benefits (indon' hav to upon vulnerable
don't have to scontrast to "domestic
accept their sterile schoolchildren partnership," for the
I lifestyles I gays)
B. The Proposition 8 Litigation.
How Constitutional Amendments Might Be Unconstitutional
Immediately after Proposition 8 was ratified by the voters, a coalition of
human rights groups filed a petition with the California Supreme Court chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the amendment.248 The petition in Strauss v.
Horton posed an important question: How can an amendment to the California
Constitution itself be unconstitutional? Perhaps surprisingly, a state constitu-
tional amendment can itself be invalid if it runs afoul any of three sources of
legal authority: (1) the California Constitution's own rule of recognition; (2)
the United States Constitution; or, perhaps, (3) the foundational constitutional
248. Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ of Mandate and Request
for Immediate Injunctive Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Strauss v. Horton, 207
P.3d 48 (Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (Case No. S 168047) [hereinafter "Prop. 8 Petition"].
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precept of individual rights. In this Section, I discuss Proposition 8's relation-
ship to each of these concepts below.
1. Conflict with the California Constitution's Rule ofRecognition
State constitutional amendments are invalid if they are inconsistent with
the rule of recognition set forth in the state constitution they purport to amend.
For example, California and most other states prohibit constitutional amend-
ments from covering more than a single subject.249 The purpose of single-
subject requirements is to prevent the constitution from filling up with logrolls,
where various groups work together to assemble a bundle of proposals, none of
which would pass muster on its own but which as a group command majority
support among the electorate. Proposition 8 surely met the single-subject
requirement.
However, the petitioners argued that Proposition 8 did not meet another
requirement of the California Constitution. Recall that Article XVIII sets forth
three ways for changing the constitution: an amendment, a revision, or a whole
new constitution.250 Amendments can be proposed either by citizen petitions or
by two-thirds votes of the legislature; once proposed, amendments become part
of the constitution if ratified by a majority of the voters in the next election. A
revision can only be proposed by a constitutional convention or a two-thirds
vote of the legislature; once proposed, revisions become part of the constitution
if ratified by a majority of the voters. Petitioners challenged Proposition 8 on
the ground that it should have gone through the process for a legislative-
constitutional-revision rather than for an initiative-constitutional-amendment.
Their argument, essentially, rested upon one important state court precedent.
In Raven v Deukmejian,251 petitioners challenged the validity of the Crime
Victims Justice Reform Act (Proposition 115), adopted by the voters in the
1990 general election. Section 3 of this initiative-constitutional-amendment
provided that certain enumerated criminal defendants' rights would be con-
strued consistently with the U.S. Constitution and that criminal and juvenile
defendants would not be afforded greater rights than those afforded by the
federal Constitution.252 Essentially, therefore, Proposition 115 placed a cap on
249. CAL. CONST., art. II, § 8, subd. (d) ("An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."); see also Brosnahan v. Brown,
651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982) (ruling that a multi-faceted initiative-constitutional-amendment passed
the single-subject test because all of the provisions were "germane" to an overall, easy-to-
understand constitutional goal).
250. CAL. CONST., art. XVIII.
251. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
252. Proposition 115 (1990) amended CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24, to add the following:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due
process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a
speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses
against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to
not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in
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the state constitutional rights of criminal defendants in state proceedings: the
state courts could not add to or expand beyond the rights afforded criminal
defendants by the U.S. Constitution, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court had in previous cases held or suggested
that "fundamental" changes in the constitution would have to go through the
more formal revision process.253 "Fundamental" changes can be either quantita-
tive or qualitative in nature. Thus, an initiative-constitutional-amendment that
rewrote almost half the constitutional text was invalidated on the ground that it
was a major quantitative change that had to go through the revision process.
254
This quantitative test did not imperil Proposition 115 (or Proposition 8), but
other cases have suggested that a change could be qualitatively fundamental.
The California Supreme Court has said that "even a relatively simple enactment
may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision. ' 255 Because the aforementioned
portion of Proposition 115 went beyond a trimming back of specific constitu-
tional rights and constituted "a broad attack on state court authority to exercise
independent judgment in construing a wide spectrum of important rights under
the state Constitution," the court ruled that it could not be added to the
constitution through the initiative process. 256 Such a fundamental realignment
could only be achieved through a legislative-constitutional-revision. The peti-
tioners in the Proposition 8 challenge argued that Raven should be extended to
cover Proposition 8 because, like section 3 of Proposition 115 in 1990, it was a
deceptively short provision working a fundamental change in the constitutional
balance of private rights and state responsibilities.
257
The attorney general of California argued that Raven was distinguishable
because the court understood Proposition 115 to change the essential Marbury
v. Madison role of the California Supreme Court. In contrast, Proposition 8
merely overrode the court on a divisive social issue and did not change the
jeopardy for the same offense, and not to suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual
punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with
the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the
courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to
minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.
253. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425-26 (Cal. 1894) (upholding an amendment but
indicating that fundamental changes can only be accomplished by revisions); McFadden v. Jordan,
196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948) (holding that an extensive set of new provisions amounted to a
revision" of the state constitution).
254. Jordan, 196 P.2d at 799.
255. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978) (quoted in Raven, 801 P.2d 1077).
256. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089 ("[Iln practical effect, the new provision vests a critical
portion of state judicial power in the United States Supreme Court, certainly a fundamental change
in our preexisting governmental plan.").
257. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 98 (Cal. 2009) (describing the petitioners' precise
legal claim that Proposition 8 represented a revision rather than an amendment).
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fundamental structure of state government. 258 Intervening to oppose the
petition, Proposition 8's proponents argued that Proposition 8 was entitled to a
strong presumption of validity because sovereignty resides in the people, and
the court is merely an agent of the people's ongoing constitutional prefer-
ences.259 Petitioners responded that the court plays an independent, coordinate
role in state constitutionalism and ought to exercise independent judgment as to
whether Proposition 8 contravened the structure of Article XVIII. 260
Raven is not as close a precedent for the Proposition 8 challenge as Perez
was for the earlier challenge to the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil
marriage. As a matter of case law, the California Supreme Court had more
logical leeway in the Proposition 8 challenge than it did in the earlier appeal.
There were several precedents where the court had upheld initiative-
constitutional-amendments that took away important constitutional rights. In
People v. Frierson, for example, the California Supreme Court ruled that
initiative-constitutional-amendments overriding its own decisions regarding the
death penalty were legitimate.261 In Strauss v. Horton, five of the seven justices
(including two who had voted to recognize same-sex marriage the year before)
joined Chief Justice George's opinion, which followed Frierson and declined
to expand Raven.262 A sixth justice (Werdegar) concurred in the result reached
26326by the court. Only Justice Moreno dissented.264
As the six majority justices agreed, the state domestic partnership law left
Proposition 8 a less drastic curtailment of rights than was the case in Raven or
even Frierson.265 A pluralism-based justification for a narrow reading of Raven
and a broad reading of cases like Frierson is that the court would significantly
raise the stakes of politics if it trumped popular opposition to same-sex
marriage a second time. The marriage debate is one that intensely but evenly
divides the body politic in California; when public opinion is intensely and
258. Answer Brief in Response to the Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 22-53, Strauss v.
Horton, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (Case No. S168047) [hereinafter Prop.
8 Answer Brief].
259. Brief for Interveners in Response to the Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 6-14, 28-
29, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (Case No. S168047) [hereinafter
Interveners' Answer to Petition].
260. See Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ of Mandate and
Request for Immediate Injunctive Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 35-43,
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (Case No. S168047). [hereinafter Prop. 8
Amended Petition].
261. People v. Freierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979) (upholding an initiative-constitutional-
amendment reinstating the death penalty and overriding the Court's constitutional precedent to do
so); see also In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985) (ruling that an initiative-constitutional-
amendment restricting the exclusionary rule for criminal defendants was not a fundamental
change in the structure of govermnent and therefore not invalid under Article XVIII).
262. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122.
263. Id. at 124-29 (Werdegar, J., concurring in the result).
264. Id. at 129-40 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Id. at 116-19 (George, C.J., for the court).
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evenly divided on an issue, a pluralist polity imperils itself by a premature
resolution.266 Because the legislature would not submit a legislative-
constitutional-revision to the voters, a decision requiring a revision rather than
an amendment would, like the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v.
Lewin, be viewed as a judicial effort to end public debate on this issue.267 That
would produce a significant backlash against the court, and perhaps roil the
body politic as well.
The pluralism-based theory advanced in this Foreword provides stronger
support for the court's resolution in light of its further holding (this one unani-
mous) that Proposition 8 does not retroactively nullify the estimated 18,000
same-sex marriages performed in the state between June 15 and November 8,
2008, the period wherein same-sex marriage was legal in California. 268 This
Solomonic disposition has several virtues. First, it is strongly consistent with
precedent and the rule of law, as American courts generally presume against
retroactivity of new statutes and constitutional provisions. 269 This presumption
places the burden of showing retroactivity on the sponsors of legislation or
initiatives, a burden the Proposition 8 proponents were unable to carry. Second,
it is respectful of the popular debate about Proposition 8, reaffirming the
people's expressed preference for a constitutional rule disallowing same-sex
marriage, but also respectful of the interests of lesbian and gay couples who
relied on the court's earlier disposition when they entered into civil matrimony.
Finally, the court's preservation of already-performed marriages provides an
opportunity for the LGBT minority to falsify stereotypes of gay people as
irresponsible, childless, and antifamily without disregarding the popular vote
revoking the right to marry for couples in the future. Same-sex marriage
advocates will certainly bring the issue back to the voters in a future initiative
constitutional amendment that would repeal Proposition 8, and any future
debate will benefit from the state's experience with those marriages that have
been legally carried out.
2. Conflict with the U.S. Constitution
State constitutional amendments are invalid if they are inconsistent with
the U.S. Constitution, treaties, or other federal law.270 Romer v. Evans is an
example of judicial review of this sort: both the Colorado Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Amendment 2, the amendment preempting
pro-gay antidiscrimination ordinances and orders, was inconsistent with the
U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and therefore invalid. An earlier
266. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93-99 (1956).
267. See supra Section II.B.
268. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 119-22 (George, C.J., for a unanimous court).
269. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); Evangelatos
v. Super. Ct., 753 P.2d 585, 597-98 (Cal. 1988).
270. U.S. CONST., art. VI.
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example is Mulkey v. Reitman.21 1 California had adopted fair housing legisla-
tion to protect racial minority citizens from being unfairly excluded from leases
and property sales transactions. In 1966, voters endorsed Proposition 14, an
initiative-constitutional-amendment that overrode the legislature's fair housing
law. 272 The California Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 14 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed.273
Ironically, the Proposition 14 challenge bears striking similarities to the
Proposition 8 challenge. In both instances, the State sought to protect a
minority class disadvantaged by prejudice and stereotyping. In both instances,
voters revoked the official protections, and civil rights groups turned to the
courts to override the popular process, an up-or-down majority vote that took
away fundamental rights from a disadvantaged minority group.
Notwithstanding these similarities and the Romer v. Evans precedent, the
petitioners in Strauss v. Horton did not assert that Proposition 8 violated the
274U.S. Constitution. The reasons are apparent. Doctrinally, Mulkey is distin-
guishable because race is a suspect classification at the federal level, but sexual
orientation is not. Romer invalidated Amendment 2 under the rational basis test
because, unlike Proposition 8, its antigay discrimination was open, broad, and
indeed limitless. Ideologically, the U.S. Supreme Court is populated with more
conservative justices. At the very least, such justices would not expand
precedent to constitutionalize a broad right to same-sex marriage. Indeed, I do
not think any of the justices-liberal or conservative-should do so in the near
future.
Even if one believes, as I do, that the best interpretation of the federal con-
stitutional text and precedent is inconsistent with state exclusions of lesbian and
gay couples from civil marriage, the issue is far from ripe at the national level.
A decision by the Supreme Court broadly addressing the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage exclusions would be unwise in the near future. A decision
upholding the constitutionality against any kind of challenge would risk the
kind of critique and even ridicule that greeted Bowers v. Hardwick,2 75 where
the Court sweepingly upheld consensual sodomy laws based upon reasoning
that was erroneous on the facts and embarrassing in its rhetoric. 276 A decision
striking down such exclusions (in a country where only five states-all but one
of them in New England-recognize same-sex marriages) would risk a
271. 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), affd sub nom. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
272. 1966 Cal. Ballot, Prop. 14.
273. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
274. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 78 n. 11 (Cal. 2009).
275. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
276. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers and citing
some of the critiques of the Court's many erroneous or factually misleading statements and
assumptions).
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ferocious backlash.277 For all these reasons, the petitioners made the right
choice in deciding not to argue that Proposition 8 violates the U.S.
Constitution.
3. Conflict with the Foundational Constitutional Precept of Individual Rights
Although he did not believe Proposition 8 was invalid as an improper
"revision," Attorney General Brown argued that the initiative-constitutional-
amendment was invalid.218 Because Proposition 8 abrogated fundamental rights
protected by Article I of the California Constitution, and did so without a
compelling public justification, the attorney general reasoned that it was incon-
sistent with the purpose of the California Constitution, and indeed the purpose
of constitutionalism more generally. 279 This form of argument is far from
unprecedented, and ultimately has some basis in pluralist theory. Like the
California Constitution, the first part of the German Constitution is a declara-
tion of individual rights, including dignitary and equality rights. Reasoning
from the structure of that constitution, the German Supreme Court has formu-
lated a doctrine of "unconstitutional constitutional amendments," which holds
that "even a constitutional amendment would be unconstitutional were it to
conflict with the core values or spirit of the Basic Law as a whole."
280
The basis for the attorney general's position is also consistent with the
social contract theory underlying Anglo-American constitutionalism. What is
the purpose of the State? The goal of the Constitution? In Leviathan (1651),
Thomas Hobbes argued that government is justified, and earns our consent, by
allowing us to escape the "state of nature." 28' The civil state exists so that
citizens can pursue their lives without fear that other citizens, or outside
invaders, will interfere with their lives and their ability to operate in the
282world. Thus, to protect citizens, the civil state needs legislatures to enact
laws serving the public interest, police to enforce those laws, and courts to
adjudicate controversies without resort to private feuds. These protections,
moreover, must be made available to everyone. The State's failure to preserve
and protect, and to make these protections broadly available so that people can
live their lives secure from fear, is for Hobbes the failure of the State to do its
277. The five states recognizing same-sex marriage are Massachusetts (2003), Connecticut
(2008), Vermont (2009), Iowa (2009), and New Hampshire (2009).
278. Prop. 8 Answer Brief, supra note 258, at 79-82, discussed in Strauss, 207 P.3d at
116-19 (George, C.J., writing for the court).
279. Id. Thus, the attorney general maintained that an important purpose for a written
constitution is to create "inalienable" rights, namely, rights that cannot be taken away by popular
majorities. Id. at 79-80.
280. DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 55, 542 n.90 (1997) (explaining the doctrine of "unconstitutional
constitutional amendments"). The "Basic Law" mentioned above is the German Constitution.
281. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIII (1651).
282. Id. chs. XIV-XVIII.
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283job. John Locke expanded upon Hobbes's analysis in A Second Treatise of
Government (1689). 284 Locke argued that the civil State not only saves people
from risks to life and limb of the state of nature, but also provides citizens with
the ability to add to their liberties and possessions, and enrich their lives
beyond what they could possibly enjoy in the state of nature.
285
The equality principle of Hobbes and Locke was a central assumption of
early American state and federal constitutional law. As James Madison put it
shortly before the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, "equality .. .
ought to be the basis of every law," and the law should not subject some
persons to "peculiar burdens" or grant others "peculiar exemptions."286 During
the ratifying debates, Madison justified the bicamerialism and presentment
requirements for lawmaking on this basis, and Hamilton deployed a similar
argument for judicial review.287 From the earliest days of the American repub-
lic, state as well as federal judges invalidated discriminatory measures they
deemed to be "class legislation," singling out one group for special advantages
or disabilities without regard to the public interest.
288
Thus, by the time California became a state, it was well established in
American constitutional law that government was not authorized to adopt class
legislation as defined above.289 The positive precept is that the civil state must
be neutral as to various groups in society, at least regarding fundamental
matters such as the enjoyment of life, guarantees of property and contract
rights, and marriage. The Equal Protection Clause (1868) of the U.S.
Constitution codifies this precept, but the California Constitution makes it even
more central by including the clause in its Declaration of Rights.290 As in the
U.S. Constitution, the fundamental baseline of California's Constitution is
equal treatment.
291
As Mulkey v. Reitman illustrates, racial minorities have been vulnerable to
initiative-constitutional-amendments that take away fundamental rights (in
Reitman, the fundamental right at stake was the right to enter into property
283. Id. Review and Conclusion (1651); see also THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF
LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 20.5 (1650).
284. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 222 (1689) (commonly referred to as the Second Treatise of Government).
285. Id. at 222; see also id. at 223-43 (more detailed explanation and account).
286. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785).
287. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing for bicameralism and presentment
in order to reduce the problem of "factions"), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for an
independent judiciary to assure that "unjust and partial laws" would receive a narrow construction
or be invalidated through judicial review).
288. See Melissa Lamb Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-
Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1996).
289. See id. at 251-68.
290. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7(a)-(b).
291. See Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1,40-42 (1977).
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transactions on a nondiscriminatory basis). As minorities, people of color
needed to attract mainstream allies to protect their rights in an up-or-down
majority vote. But as minorities long subject to prejudice and stereotyping,
people of color in the 1960s had a hard time attracting allies. Many prejudiced
voters favored any measure that harmed or excluded people of color, and most
moderate voters harbored racial stereotypes that made them reluctant to vote
for equal treatment. In part because the California Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court have insisted that citizens of color not be subject to class
legislation and special exclusions, Americans have gradually accepted the
principle that race ought not be a basis for exclusion in public law.
Reitman was decided in an era before gay rights rose to the upper levels of
the public agenda, and today sexual and gender minorities have joined or, in
some states, replaced racial minorities as a particularly vulnerable group in
popular initiatives. As a minority, gay people need to attract mainstream allies
to protect their rights in an up-or-down majority vote-but as a minority long
subject to prejudice and stereotyping, it remains hard for this group to attract
allies. Many prejudiced voters favor any measure that harms or excludes
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, or transgendered persons, and even moderate
voters are often reluctant because of the antigay stereotypes (e.g., "predatory
homosexuals" who "recruit" vulnerable children and destroy traditional fami-
lies) that the State has long built into its state policy.
2 92
As the Marriage Cases recognized, sexual orientation is a suspect classifi-
cation for the same reasons race and sex are, and marriage is a fundamental
right for lesbian and gay couples just as it is for interracial couples whose rights
were protected in Perez v. Sharp. The whole point of a constitution-according
to the social contract theory, the founders of our nation, and the terms of
California's state constitution-is to entrench guarantees that all citizens can
count on. In light of these constitutional commitments, Article XVIII can be
read to require that higher hurdles be surmounted before the voters can add to
the California Constitution class legislation that takes away a fundamental
constitutional right from a historically prejudiced minority. If such class legis-
lation is really needed to protect the overall public interest, then it ought to go
through the screening process entailed in legislative-constitutional-revisions, at
the very least, or perhaps even trigger a new constitutional convention.
Chief Justice George's opinion for the court in Strauss abated the
foregoing concerns by injecting an argument he had dismissed in the Marriage
Cases. Unlike most other states that have barred same-sex marriages either by
legislation or popular initiatives, California has adopted a statewide institution
292. On California's long history of demonizing homosexuals as predatory against children
and as antifamily, see ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 37, at 46-108. On the
uphill battle the gay and lesbian minority faces in popular votes, see Haider-Markel et al., supra
note 221, at 304-14 (documenting that 71 percent of antigay ballot initiatives prevailed in the
period 1972-2005).
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(domestic partnerships) that provides virtually all of the legal rights and duties
of marriage. 293 For this reason, Chief Justice George (writing for the court) and
Justice Werdegar (concurring in the court's result) characterized the change
wrought by Proposition 8 as a narrow rather than fundamental one.2 14 All it did,
according to the court, was reserve
the official designation of the term "marriage" for the union of
opposite-sex couples as a matter of state constitutional law, but [leave]
undisturbed all of the other extremely significant substantive aspects of
a same-sex couple's state constitutional right to establish an officially
recognized and protected family relationship and the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.295
As before, the chief justice's reasoning is driven as much by pluralist prag-
matics as by the legal precedents: given the full legal rights and duties available
under the domestic partnership law, the gay marriage issue is substantially a
matter of symbolic politics, and therefore a matter as to which judges ought not
trump the will of the people, expressed through the duly established mechanism
for constitutional amendment.
C. A Theory for Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Strauss v. Horton is deferen-
tial to the initiative process, and that deference is consistent with the state
constitutional structure. Since 1911, the California Constitution has rejected the
assumption of the U.S. Constitution that direct democracy has no constructive
role to play in republican governance. 296 "Government is instituted for [the
people's] protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform it when the public good may require. 297 Hence, each of the
mechanisms for changing the California Constitution-amendment, revision, or
replacement-requires a majority vote of the electorate, and the amendment
298process can be initiated by the voters, completely bypassing the legislature.
On the other hand, California's constitution has not rejected all of the
concerns of the federal Framers, and ought not be interpreted to do so. Article
XVIII creates a hierarchy of constitutional change, with a strong correlation
293. Originally enacted in 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 588, the Domestic Partner Act has been
frequently amended and is codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 et al. See In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413-18 (Cal. 2008) (George, C.J., writing for the court), for a discussion of
the statewide domestic partnership law in its evolution.
294. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 102 (Cal. 2009) (George, C.J., writing for the court);
id. at 127-28 (Werdegar, J., concurring in the result).
295. Id. at 61 (George, C.J., writing for the court).
296. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining why the framers of the U.S.
Constitution rejected any role for direct democracy, namely, the fear that temporary "factions"
would oppress minorities).
297. CAL. CONST., art. II, § 1.
298. Id. art. XVIII, §§ 1-3; see also id. art. II, § 8(b) (signature requirements for bypassing
the legislature with a citizen-sponsored initiative).
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between the degree of change and the depth of institutional deliberative filters
through which a change must pass:
" Amendment, an ordinary change to the constitution, can be initiated
by voter petition (or by the legislature) and then ratified by a
majority of the voters in the next election;
* Revision, a fundamental change to the constitution, can only be
initiated by two-thirds vote of the legislature and then ratified by a
majority of the voters in the next election;
" Replacement, the creation of a new constitution, can only be
proposed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, followed by a
constitutional convention, whose product must then be ratified by a
majority of the voters in the next election.
This is the structure found in the California Constitution-but it is not the
reality of the direct democracy seen in today's California, where the revision
process has dried up and the initiative-based amendment process has become a
mechanism by which losers in the judicial or legislative process take their case
to the voters through initiative constitutional amendments. Political scientist
Bruce Cain dubs this phenomenon hyper-amendability.
299
Hyper-amendability is not limited to California, and so the argument in
this Foreword can be generalized. Like California, many other states have
separate procedures for simple amendment of their constitutions, for significant
revision, and for complete replacement with a new constitution.3"' State
constitutional amendment activity across the United States continues at a high
and now accelerated level: there were 689 state constitutional amendments in
the period from 1994 to 2001. 301 A large chunk of those initiative-based state
constitutional amendments have been aimed at sexual and gender minorities-
not only the anti-gay-marriage initiatives that have been adopted in California
and twenty-nine other states,302 but also initiatives depriving sexual and gender
minorities of rights to adopt children and to the protections of antidiscrimina-
tion laws. In contrast, the pace of state constitutional revision or replacement
has slowed to a dead stop.
30 3
299. See Bruce Cain et al., Constitutional Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our State
Constitution?, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE
EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce Cain & Roger Noll eds., 1995).
300. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 110 n.34 (listing seventeen state constitutions that distinguish
between amendments and revisions); id. at 111-14 (discussing gay marriage decisions in other
states following the amendment-revision distinction).
301. See Cain, supra note 299 (detailed data on state constitutional amendments and
revisions).
302. Thirty states have state constitutional bars to marriage for same-sex couples, all of
them adopted by popular initiatives. For a current list, see Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex
Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-
same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
303. There were 144 constitutional conventions and 94 new state constitutions in the
nineteenth century, but only 84 conventions and 23 new constitutions in the twentieth, and none
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The structure of California's and other states' constitutions suggests good
reasons for the California Supreme Court and other state high courts to set
limits in the face of hyper-amendability, especially as regards antiminority
initiatives. Without enforceable limits, hyper-amendability will swallow up
Article XVIII and negate its deliberation and filtering requirements for
fundamental changes. What follows is an effort to translate the Article XVIII
structure-popular initiative-amendments, legislative/popular revision-amend-
ments, and legislative/convention/popular replacements-and its rationale into
a workable set of presumptions for judicial review. The baseline presumption,
also derived from the California Constitution, favors the validity of initiative-
constitutional-amendments.
1. Correcting for Legislative Biases
The first structural feature of Article XVIII's distinction between amend-
ments and revisions or new constitutions is that the former allow "We the
People" to circumvent the California legislature, while the latter must be
proposed by the legislature.30 4 As a matter of both logic and history, the
primary reason for allowing constitutional amendments by direct majority vote
of the people is that the legislature is not always responsive to strong public
needs and preferences.
There are three functional scenarios that inspired the 1911 addition of the
constitutional initiative process to the California Constitution. First is the
problem of self-dealing. The legislature can be expected to be biased in favor of
its members' positions of power and authority. Political insiders tend toward
policies that preserve their positions, power, and authority in ways that do not
serve the interests of the public. In setting electoral districts and terms of office,
regulating the conduct and financing of campaigns, responding to criticisms,
and asserting their own jurisdiction, legislators are prone to act in their own
self-interest even when such action is not in the overall public interest or
favored by the electorate. 30 5 This problem is of constitutional dimension,
because the legislature is an agent of the public and is supposed to act only in
the public interest.
30 6
since 1984. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM xi-xii (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F.
Williams eds., 2006).
304. To be sure, an initiative-constitutional-amendment can be proposed by the legislature,
but my point is that constitutional amendments need not be. Also, the hyper-amendability
phenomenon may be marginalizing the legislative-initiative option; it is easier to pay organiza-
tions to collect signatures than to persuade the legislature to place a matter on the ballot.
305. See Stephen Smith, Direct Democracy and Election and Ethics Laws, in DEMOCRACY
IN THE STATES (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2008).
306. See also ELY, supra note 181 (arguing from the premises of constitutionalism
generally (and the U.S. Constitution in particular) that there needs to be an outside monitor to
offset the tendency of political "insiders" to insulate themselves at the expense of the public
interest).
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Second is the problem of overregulation. In the post-New Deal era,
legislators tend to favor more taxes, bigger government, and more regulations
than voters do. 3 07 Legislators usually view their job as solving public problems,
typically through a proactive government program. Voters, too, want their
representatives to solve problems, but tend to be more cost-conscious, because
by and large it is voters and not legislators who bear the burdens and pay the
costs of regulation. The constitutional initiative is a mechanism for the voters to
place limits on or to channel legislative innovations in the direction the public
prefers. Unlike the self-dealing problem, which has a constitutional dimension,
the overregulation problem is one of policy balance.
Third is the problem of special interests. During the Progressive Era,
when the initiative was added to the California Constitution, a primary justifi-
cation was to short-circuit the influence of "special interests," namely, interest
groups who seek favors from government or try to head off needed
regulation. 308 Although an important justification for mechanisms of direct
democracy, the special interests justification is the trickiest, because the key
term depends on a political judgment. In the Proposition 8 campaign,
proponents saw gay people as a "special interest" seeking to impose costs on
parents and their children, while opponents of Proposition 8 saw its sponsors as
"special interests" mobilizing antigay stereotypes and prejudice in an effort to
reassert a "special exception" to the constitutional right to marry. The
California Constitution weighs in on this debate in the following way: its
Declaration of Rights 30 9 tells us that groups seeking to protect dignitary,
equality, speech, and other important constitutional rights are acting in the
public interest in the most serious way.
3 10
As a matter of constitutional structure, Article XVIII, read together with
the whole California Constitution, provides a mechanism for the voters to
amend the constitution when the legislature is not likely to pursue the public
307. While the statement in text seems to be true of the post-New Deal era, in the early
twentieth century, voters tended to favor more regulation in many areas. For a historical and
empirical analysis along these lines, see JOHN MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE
INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).
308. For a thoughtful analysis of direct democracy and "special interests," see ALAN
GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY (1999).
309. CAL. CONST., art. I. Like the German Constitution, the California Constitution's first
article is its Declaration of Rights. Contrast the U.S. Constitution, whose Bill of Rights was added
after the document was ratified and went into effect.
310. Such claims must be objectively plausible, for almost any issue can be expressed in
terms of individual rights as well as policy. For example, contrast the equality claims of the
plaintiffs in the Marriage Cases, which were not only plausible claims that had been accepted by
other courts and were persuasive to a majority of the neutral arbiters of this Court, with the liberty
claims made by the proponents of Proposition 8, such as the speculative (in my view, flatly
incorrect) assertion made in some ads that marriage recognition for same-sex couples would
require churches to give up their religious principles.
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interest.311 Under direct democracy, initiatives, rather than revisions, are
especially appropriate for matters of basic governance, such as the allocation of
public resources and tax burdens; the rules governing lobbying, electoral
districts, campaign finance, and ethics in government; and limits on the
authority of government, including limits grounded in personal rights as well as
allocational decisions. As for initiative-based constitutional amendments
addressing any of these matters, the constitution suggests a strong presumption
of validity. The strong presumption can be overcome by a showing that the
amendment has made an overbroad and fundamental change in the constitution-
al authority and duties of an organ of government.
The foregoing analysis does not, however, tell us how more intangible
matters of great public debate ought to be handled. Issues of interest to the
voters such as the death penalty, the legal status of marijuana and other drugs,
affirmative action, and aid in dying (or "death with dignity") are increasingly
the subject of constitutional initiatives all over the country, including
California. Are there situations in which "public values" initiative-
constitutional-amendments lose that presumption of validity and ought to be
pressed as revisions?
2. Supermajorities to Protect Minorities
A second distinction between Article XVIII initiative-constitutional-
amendments and legislative-constitutional-revisions (or replacements) is that
the latter are not only necessarily screened by the legislature, but also require
two-thirds votes in both chambers of the legislature before they can be
312presented to the voters for approval. Revisions therefore must pass through a
screen that is triply difficult: (1) legislators must approve them; (2) indeed, both
chambers must approve; and (3) a supermajority must approve. This is a
demanding process, and the foregoing discussion of legislative bias demon-
strates that this is not a process well suited for constitutional changes that
involve ordinary governance issues or deregulation.
With regard to those issues, California's progressive tradition departs
from the republicanism of the U.S. Constitution, but on issues requiring a
constitutional revision, California has hewed to the republican arguments of the
Framers at Philadelphia. Madison's The Federalist No. 10 is the leading state-
ment of the reasons to fear direct democracy: temporary "factions" might adopt
measures that would oppress "minorities." 313 Although Madison was thinking
of economic minorities (big property owners and creditors), not racial or sexual
311. Many scholars are critical of the voters' ability to do a better job or even to figure out
what is in their own interest, but for my positive argument I place those objections to one side.
312. As before, the analysis above does not apply to legislative-constitutional-amendments,
which also require a two-thirds vote in the legislature to secure a place on the ballot. CAL. CONST.,
art. XVIII, § 1.
313. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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minorities, his deliberative filters idea retains its cogency: the complex process
of lawmaking prevents many measures that might oppress minorities by
slowing them down, forcing the proponents to defend the measures to different
audiences, and providing minorities more opportunities to defeat or ameliorate
extreme measures.
From the perspective of democratic constitutionalism, the best justifica-
tion for such a demanding process is to protect fundamental constitutional
rights, especially those of minorities who are vulnerable in an up-or-down
majority vote of all adult citizens. The supermajority requirements for a revi-
sion are also responsive to America's and California's long equality traditions,
where all citizens are assured the fundamental rights guaranteed by the State.
California's Declaration of Rights not only says that "[a] person may not be
• . . denied equal protection of the laws," 314 but emphasizes the converse that
"[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not
granted on the same terms to all citizens." 3 15 A central purpose of California's
constitution is to create guarantees that all citizens can count on. Thus, a
natural reading of Article XVIII is that voters cannot alter the California
Constitution to take away a fundamental constitutional right.
This analysis is also compatible with the attorney general's position in the
Proposition 8 challenge, properly understood.3 16 The attorney general said that
Proposition 8 deprived a minority group of an "inalienable right," and that
cannot be accomplished through an initiative-constitutional-amendment. 31 7 The
attorney general remained open to the possibility that a legislative-
constitutional-revision might alter "inalienable rights," and the foregoing
analysis provides some support for that possibility. In turn, however, it is
possible that "inalienable rights" can only be compromised by the third option
under Article XVIII: convening a constitutional convention and ultimately
replacing the current constitution with a new one. As argued above, hyper-
amendability has made that process, like the revision process, almost irrelevant.
However, if a state supreme court were to rule that the initiative-constitutional-
amendment process cannot be the basis for a sweeping change like the one
wrought by Proposition 8, the decision might engender a broader constitutional
conversation.
3. Deliberation to Impose Rationality Requirements
There is a third feature of Article XVIII that is relevant to drawing the
amendment-revision-replacement line. The legislative-constitutional-revision
314. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7(a).
315. Id. art. I, § 7(b).
316. Chief Justice George's opinion for the court dismissed the attorney general's analysis
as nothing more than warmed-over natural law. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 116-19 (Cal.
2009). 1 think there is more to be said for the attorney general's theory.
317. See Prop. 8 Answer Brief, supra note 258, at 79-82.
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process is characteristically deliberative in a deeper way than the initiative-
constitutional-amendment process is. The amendment process involves public
debate, but differs from the revision process in terms of reasons, transparency,
and accountability. In the popular debate, conducted largely in the media,
appeals are often emotional, and policy justifications are typically unsupported
by facts or solid information. For example, the proponents of Proposition 8
centrally maintained that state recognition of same-sex marriage would require
schools to teach children that "gay marriage" is just as good as "traditional
marriage"; as demonstrated above, such a strong claim is false.
3 18
Of course, emotional appeals and nonfactual claims are found in the
legislative process, as well. The difference is that such claims are subject to the
deliberation requirement of Article XVIII. Any legislator making such a claim
is immediately subject to dispute by other legislators. Unlike voters, who can
cast their vote anonymously and for any reason (including prejudice), legisla-
tors must cast their votes publicly and are accountable to defend their votes
based upon public reason. If a legislator's public reason is clearly a
makeweight or invokes phony stereotypes, then she or he will be subject to
media and other criticism, maybe even ridicule. This process does not mean
that sexual and gender minorities always win in the legislature (or that they
should). What it does mean is that there is greater assurance that legislative
deliberation will render a judgment that is more accountable to reason and facts
than the judgment of anonymous voters in an amendment contest. Moreover,
the legislative process allows public deliberation to change and shape policy
proposals before they are adopted as law.
Consider this thought experiment. Assume that the U.S. Supreme Court in
1949 vacated the California Supreme Court's opinion in Perez because the
(pre-Brown v. Board of Education) Court felt that such an interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution would inflame half the nation. On remand, assume that the
California Supreme Court reasserted its holding under the California Constitu-
tion's several equality guarantees. And in 1950, the voters added this to the
California Constitution through an initiative-constitutional-amendment: "To
prevent a dilution of the white race, no nonwhite person can marry a white
person in this state, nor shall such a marriage be recognized." Is this an
initiative-constitutional-amendment that can be added by majority vote-a vote
that was surely fueled by racial prejudice and stereotypes? Or is it properly
characterized as a legislative-constitutional-revision that has to go through the
legislature first? Or, following the implications of the attorney general's posi-
tion in Strauss v. Horton, is this a change that cannot be made to the existing
constitution and thus would require a constitutional convention?
318. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of
Mandate at 10-17, Jenkins v. Bowen, Case No. 34-2008-00017366-CU-WM-GDS (Super. Ct.,
County of Sacramento, Aug. 4, 2008) (demonstrating the inaccuracy of proponents' claims that
the Marriage Cases would force schools to teach a specific agenda).
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The point of this thought experiment is that there ought to be limits to
popular constitutional amendments that deprive a minority of a fundamental
right. Allowing a minority group to be denied a fundamental marriage right by
simple popular vote not only makes it too easy to inflict constitutional harm
upon a minority, but it harms the community by raising the stakes of identity
politics and by undermining the pluralist process. Of course, some antiminority
campaigns would prevail even in the legislature, but the deliberation entailed in
the legislative revision process would almost certainly have yielded more
moderate language than that quoted above. Specifically, the legislature would
almost certainly have deleted the prefatory clause ("To prevent a dilution of the
white race") and might have removed the white supremacy gloss to yield
something like this: "No person can marry another person of a different race in
this state, nor shall such a marriage be recognized." However lamentable such a
legislative-constitutional-revision would have been, such deliberated-upon
language would have been the least offensive version of it.
Yet the majority opinion in Strauss suggests that the justices may no
longer be willing to enforce the amendment revision line in a meaningful way.
The bar is set very high:
only if a measure embodies a constitutional change that is so far reach-
ing and extensive that the framers of the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions
would have intended that the type of change could be proposed only by
a constitutional convention, and not by the normal amendment process,
can the measure properly be characterized as a constitutional revision
rather than as a constitutional amendment.
31 9
Under this test, my hypothetical Perez override would be considered an
acceptable amendment, a result that strikes me as contrary to the structure of
the state's constitution as well as harmful to minorities and the polity. Notwith-
standing the chief justice's broad endorsement of popular constitutionalism, the
foregoing structural argumentation urges the California Supreme Court to
remain open to a broader role, ably defended along traditional legal lines in
Justice Werdegar's concurring opinion 32 and in Justice Moreno's dissenting
S• 321
opinion.
The hypothetical popular constitutional initiative overriding Perez
illustrates the virtues of the Werdegar-Moreno approach that holds out the
possibility of meaningful judicial review of popular initiatives that go after
minorities. In addition to my structural constitutional analysis above, and the
reasons adduced by Justices Werdegar and Moreno, their approach has a huge
pragmatic virtue, for it allows the California Supreme Court to dispose of puni-
tive antiminority measures without setting hard constitutional limits of the sort
the attorney general was proposing. Assume that Proposition 8 had not only
319. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 103 (George, C.J., writing for the court).
320. Id. at 124-29 (Werdegar, J., concurring in the result).
321. Id. at 129-40 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
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hardwired one man, one woman marriage into the California Constitution, but
had also constitutionalized a bar against providing same-sex couples any of the
legal benefits or duties of marriage. It is conceivable that such a measure could
have secured majority votes in 2000, the year of the Knight Initiative. Such a
measure would have, essentially, excluded lesbian and gay couples from an
indeterminate number of legal protections. From their point of view, such an
initiative would have represented a partial return to a Hobbesian state of nature.
From the polity's point of view, such an initiative would have triggered a
destructive civil war, certainly ramping up hatred and tensions and perhaps
erupting into violence between angered gays and righteous traditionalists.
Under the chief justice's approach, the California Supreme Court would have
had no recourse under the California Constitution.
322
In short, the structure of the California Constitution and the pluralist
theory that underlies its process for amendment, revision, and replacement
suggest the following hierarchy for evaluating the validity of amendments:
(1) Strong Presumption of Validity for Amendments Relating to
Governance.
(2) Presumption of Validity for Public Values Amendments, Especial-
ly Those Limiting Government.
(3) Presumption of Invalidity for Amendments Denying Fundamental
Rights to Minorities.
This hierarchy and the presumptions embedded within it are consistent with the
court's ruling in Strauss v. Horton, but furthermore reflect greater concern for
setting limits on the use of initiative-constitutional-amendments to attack
minorities than the chief justice's opinion for the court did.
The Marriage Cases of the 2007 Term and the Proposition 8 Case of the
2008 Term show how far California has come toward recognizing the equal
citizenship of sexual and gender minorities. Unlike the era of Governor Earl
Warren, no one was suggesting that lesbian and gay couples were criminal or
degenerate or even predatory. Unlike the more tolerant era of the 1970s, no one
disputed the availability of marriagelike benefits for lesbian and gay couples,
and no one was trying to break up gay and lesbian families. The debate had
narrowed to these symbolic points: Are the romantic unions of LGBT Califor-
nians entitled to every bit of the same legal respect and terminology accorded
traditionally straight marriages? Are gay families "normal" or merely "virtually
normal"? For the time being, still the latter.
322. There could, of course, be a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was the basis for the California Supreme Court's holding in Mulkey. Whether
the Roberts Court would extend the protections of Romer v. Evans to strike down a state
constitutional amendment denying lesbian and gay couples all legal rights of marriage is a matter
open to speculation.
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The big contribution of the California Supreme Court toward marriage
equality for LGBT persons is the same contribution the court made in earlier
periods: the justices were able to reverse the burden of political inertia on an
issue. As in the past, the justices had neither the ability nor the inclination to
push the polity too hard on the equality rights of sexual and gender minorities.
Thus, when the voters responded to the Marriage Cases with a reaffirmation of
traditional one man, one woman marriage, the California Supreme Court
deferred to their judgment, but the court did so knowing that it was a judgment
subject to change. By recognizing and preserving the thousands of same-sex
marriages lawfully entered into within the state before the November 2008
election, the court unanimously made a modest contribution to the ongoing
normative debate. But the answer today might be revised tomorrow.
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